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Articles
Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust
Needs a New Deal
Rebecca Haw
Power to interpret the Sherman Act, and thus power to make broad
changes to antitrust policy, is currently vested in the Supreme Court. But re-
evaluation of existing competition rules requires economic evidence, which
the Court cannot gather on its own, and technical economic savvy, which it
lacks. To compensate for these deficiencies, the Court has turned to amicus
briefs to supply the economic information and reasoning behind its recent
changes to antitrust policy. This Article argues that such reliance on amicus
briefs makes Supreme Court antitrust adjudication analogous to administra-
tive notice-and-comment rulemaking. When the Court pays careful attention
to economic evidence and arguments presented in amicus briefs, it moves the
process away from a traditional Article III case or controversy and towards
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) where any inter-
ested party can influence the decision. In doing so, the Court sacrifices some
of the epistemological benefits of Article III's standing requirements. In the
case of antitrust, those costs are probably outweighed by how much the
Court benefits from hearing the amici's economic arguments. But while the
Court's hybrid rulemaking-quasi-administrative and quasi-judicial-may
improve upon the traditional judicial model, it cannot realize the full benefits
of APA rulemaking. The awkwardness of using amicus curiae briefs like
comments on a rulemaking suggests a more dramatic shift in authority over
the Sherman Act is necessary. Power to interpret the Act in the first instance
should go to an administrative agency.
Introduction
The Sherman Act's condemnation of "[e]very ... combination . . . in
restraint of trade" and "[e]very person who shall monopolize" is so unfo-
cused that whoever is in charge of its interpretation has broad leeway to
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shape economic policy.' That duty falls on the courts, who must sort out
the details of what practices and pricing schemes amount to unreasonably
anticompetitive behavior. As in other federal statutory cases, the Supreme
Court has the final word on the Act's meaning. But because the Sherman
Act is so vague and so broad, the Court's task in developing specific rules
under it is more like constitutional interpretation than statutory
2interpretation. Like constitutional law, the modem law of the Sherman Act
has been developed through the common law process: case-by-case adjudi-
cation of disputes between particular parties, over decades of refinement,
and even reversals.
But making law under the Sherman Act differs from deciding typical
common law questions. In defining contract or property rights, Justices can
reason primarily by analogy, informed by intuition and broad considerations
of morality and efficiency and constrained, of course, by precedent. But the
modem antitrust imperative demands technical and quantitative reasoning.
Antitrust rules must be designed to maximize consumer welfare through
economically efficient competition.5 For this kind of technical thinking, the
Justices need help. In the Supreme Court, help with understanding eco-
nomic theory and interpreting empirical data on competition (or, more
often, its absence) comes from amicus briefs, which often present more
economic arguments than the parties' briefs.6 Unsurprisingly, these amicus
briefs receive considerable attention from the Court and influence its
opinions.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
2. William Howard Taft wrote that the words of the Sherman Act were written "with the
intention that they should be interpreted in the light of common law, just as it has been frequently
decided that the terms used in our federal Constitution are to be so construed." WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1914).
3. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 136-37 (1984).
4. See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Economics-Making Progress, Avoiding Regression, 12
GEO. MASON L. REv. 163, 165 (2003) ("[Tlhe rapid assimilation of microeconomics into antitrust
thinking makes almost every antitrust controversy an exercise in microeconomic analysis.").
5. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1159, 1212 (2008)
("Within the last few decades a broad consensus has emerged that consumer welfare and economic
efficiency are the overriding, if not exclusive, goals."); Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 138 (stating
that the Court views antitrust laws as a consumer-welfare prescription).
6. See, e.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners at 3-6, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109
(2009) (No. 07-512), 2008 WL 4154540 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision harms consumers
and protects competitors rather than competition); Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of
Petitioners, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2506633
(discussing how the parallel-behavior-is-enough standard would increase economic costs).
7. See generally Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2001);
Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 ANTITRUST L.J.
269 (1993).
1248 [Vol. 89:1247
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In relying so heavily on arguments from nonparties, the Court mimics
the procedures used by other branches of government to make decisions
involving technical inputs and reasoning. When an agency regulates com-
plicated systems, like energy markets or the environment, it solicits third-
party input through notice-and-comment rulemaking.8 Similarly, the Court
looks to amici to parse difficult theoretical arguments and present empirical
data about competition economics. Friends of the court-trade
organizations, companies, and groups of professors-use amicus briefs to
solicit a particular rule from the Court, in the same way that those same
third parties lobby agencies through comments on rulemaking. And like an
administrative agency, the Court seems to feel some obligation to respond
to the amici's arguments in their final decision.
The Court is certainly right to open the conversation to all affected
parties, including amici who have economic arguments and data but not
Article III standing to join the suit. The Court is better off with the amici
than without them-the informational benefits of open amicus participation
outweigh the costs of relaxing justiciability requirements to give third par-
ties such a powerful voice in the litigation.9 But to be complacent with the
Court's current reliance on amici ignores a better solution.
Instead of forcing the Court to approximate agency decision making by
relying on amicus briefs, we should endow an antitrust agency with author-
ity to make Sherman Act rules in the first instance. 'o Such an agency could
go further than the Court can in soliciting expert opinions, conducting
studies, and collecting data. It would have the advantage of economic
expertise. And it would be accountable in a way that the Court is not, since
its rules and decisions would be subject to judicial review.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I summarize the history
of amicus participation and justifications for its use in technical areas of law
like antitrust. Part II shows that in relying on amici, the Court acts like an
agency-but not quite. This Part explains the similarities and important
differences between the antitrust Supreme Court and a proper rulemaking
agency, arguing that the Court's hybrid solution sacrifices some of the
benefits of Article III's cases and controversies requirement while failing to
fully realize the benefits of Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
rulemaking. Part III provides two recent examples of Supreme Court
rulemaking in antitrust: Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
9. See Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, supra note 7, at 628-38 (highlighting the ways in
which amici's arguments have advanced antitrust doctrine).
10. For the case for administrative antitrust decision making, see Crane, supra note 5, at 1212-
14 (discussing three features of modem antitrust that make it particularly suited to technocracy).
2011]1 1249
HeinOnline  -- 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 2010-2011
Texas Law Review
Communications, Inc." and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc.12 In these cases, the Court made mistakes that were at least partially
attributable to its reliance on amicus briefs for economics. Finally, in
Section IV, I take up the idea that an agency should be endowed with
norm-creation authority over antitrust policy. I argue that where amicus
briefs fail, administrative procedures are more likely to succeed. Part V
concludes.
I. The Court's Use of Amici in Technical Cases
The Court's heavy reliance on amicus briefs is by no means unique to
antitrust; almost no case is briefed before it without some help from a
"friend."' 3  And the influence of amici on Supreme Court decisions is
significant.14 But a narrow reading of Article III's cases and controversies
requirement would make this participation of amici impossible, since under
that clause only parties with a justiciable dispute can petition a court for
redress. How did amicus briefs come to their current prominence, and what
do we know about their influence on the Justices?
A. The Rise of the Amicus Brief in the Twentieth Century
Article III limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies."15 To effectuate this requirement, the Court has created the
doctrines of standing, ripeness, mootness, and personal jurisdiction, to name
only a few. But amicus participation has opened a constitutional back door
to interested third parties who want to influence a judicial decision but lack
standing or injury.6 Although the constitutionality of amicus briefs is
uncontroversial,' 7 at times the Court has seemed ambivalent about their
proper role.
11. 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
12. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
13. Ninety-five percent of cases filed before the Supreme Court between 1996 and 2003
included at least one amicus brief. Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus
Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REv. 185, 193 (2009).
14. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 828-30 (2000) (concluding that amicus briefs do have an
impact on the Court, particularly when they come from major institutional litigants or the Solicitor
General).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. See Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After
the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1243, 1280-82 (1992) (warning that expanded use of the
amicus device allows would-be litigants to circumvent the standing requirements of Article III).
17. Some scholars have gone as far as to find a constitutional right to participate as amicus
curiae. Professor Ruben J. Garcia locates the right in the First Amendment's prohibition on
governmental interference with the "right of the people ... to petition the government for a redress
1250 [Vol. 89:1247
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In 1939, the Supreme Court crystallized procedures for filing amicus
briefs in what is now United States Supreme Court Rule 3 7 .18 It allowed
amicus briefs to be filed with the consent of all parties, or when that was
denied, the consent of the Court.1 9 Governmental representatives-state
attorneys general and the Solicitor General-could file in any case.20 In the
decades after promulgating this rule, the Court was inundated by
"propagandistic" briefs in cases involving the House Un-American
Activities Committee and the Rosenbergs' espionage trial.2 1 Although the
Court did not materially alter the rules, it responded by adopting an
"unwritten policy of denying virtually all motions for leave to file as amicus
curiae" when the parties denied consent.22
But again the Court changed its mind, and by the 1960s its attitude
towards amicus participation was laissez-faire. Today, leave to file an
amicus brief is granted as a matter of course. Formally, the rules have not
changed-an amicus must get permission from either the parties or the
Court to file a brief.23  But since the Court's "current practice in argued
cases is to grant nearly all motions for leave to file as amicus curiae when
consent is denied by a party," in practice amici face an open door.24
Thanks to this permissive attitude, at least in part, the number of amicus
briefs filed at the Supreme Court rose 800% between 1946 and 1995.25
The Court's attitude towards third-party participation in suits loosely
tracked its feelings about another affront to Article III: administrative
agencies.26 In 1937, the same year it codified rules about amicus
participation, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
of grievances." Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory ofAmicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
315, 336-38 (2008) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 1) (emphasis added).
18. SUP. CT. R. 27.9, 306 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1939) (repealed 1954); see also Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 14, at 761 n.54 (chronicling the Supreme Court's changes to the rules governing
amicus briefs).
19. Id.
20. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 761-62.
21. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 709-11 (1963) (describing the increasing irritation with amicus participation building during
the 1940s and reaching "an apex of notoriety and criticism" in the early 1950s, due in large part to
lobbying from liberal groups in cases involving communism).
22. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 763.
23. SUP. CT. R. 37.3.
24. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 762; see also Ed R. Hayden & Kelly Fitzgerald Pate,
The Role ofAmicus Briefs, 70 ALA. LAW. 115, 118 (2009) (asserting that the U.S. Supreme Court
has traditionally been open to amicus curiae briefing); Simmons, supra note 13, at 195-96
(commenting on the Supreme Court's allowance of virtually unlimited amicus participation).
25. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 749.
26. Professor Samuel Krislov has traced the rise of amicus advocacy in part to the "emergence
of administrative agencies." Krislov, supra note 21, at 706. For a more recent observation along
these lines, see Simmons, supra note 13, at 193.
2011] 1251
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National Labor Relations Act,27 a statute that gave broad authority to an
agency to adjudicate controversies. Described by one commentator as the
Court's "large-scale retreat from policing the structural boundaries of con-
gressional power," the opinion favored the nemesis of anti-New Dealers: the
NLRB.2 8 And just as the 1940s saw a clamping down on amicus briefs, so
the '40s witnessed the reining in of agency power in the form of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 29  Again the Court's attitude reversed, and
today it places minimal limits on agency action and effectively none on
amicus participation.
B. How the Court Uses Amicus Briefs
What accounts for the liberalizing of judicial attitudes towards amicus
participation? The Court's increased interest in amicus argument coincided
with the rise of legal realism, 30 which rejected the idea that judges discover
law as a scientist discovers physical properties of the universe. As the
Court began to imagine its role to be policy making, access to information
about the effects of that policy became necessary to make rules responsive
to social needs.' In Muller v. Oregon,32 Louis Brandeis filed an amicus
brief citing social scientific data about women in the workforce that proved
influential on the Court.33 The case challenged the constitutionality of
limitations on work hours for women, and the Court found support in
studies cited in Brandeis's brief indicating physiological differences in
women that the law could take notice of without violating equal
34protection.
27. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
28. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192 (4th ed. 2007).
29. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 1557, 1678-79 (1996) (describing the APA as the result
of years of conservative attempts to curtail the power of New Deal administrative agencies).
30. Simmons, supra note 13, at 194-95.
3 1. Perhaps this is why Justices Frankfurter and Black, the former preferring an early form of
judicial minimalism and the latter more willing to "depart from a role of narrowly resolving
adversary disputes," disagreed about the proper role for amicus briefs. Krislov, supra note 2 1, at
717. Samuel Krislov, writing in 1963, traced the rise of amicus advocacy in part to the "emergence
of administrative agencies." Id. at 706. For further discussion of the Frankfurter-Black debate
about amicus curiae, see Simmons, supra note 13, at 195.
32. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
33. Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL
27605. Justice Brandeis's role in the litigation was ambiguous, since he appeared for the State of
Oregon, believing that "'the status of appearing as an official participant on behalf of the state
seemed ... an important element of strength for the defense."' Krislov, supra note 21, at 708
(quoting LOWELL MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 248 (1959)). It was not until 1916 that
Frankfurter observed that "Brandeis' role was essentially that of amicus curiae." Id. at 708.
34. See Garcia, supra note 17, at 340 n.150.
1252 [Vol. 89:1247
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After Brandeis's success in Muller, amici increasingly filed briefs
citing social science data in favor of a legal outcome.35  These briefs
became known as "Brandeis Briefs."36 Perhaps the most famous use of so-
cial scientific data in Supreme Court policy making is the brief submitted
by the NAACP in Brown v. Board of Education.3 7 The brief cited a study
as empirical support for the idea that school children were injured by segre-
gation in terms of academic advancement and self-esteem. The Court used
the brief and the study to bolster its opinion that was ostensibly based on
purely legal interpretations of equal protection, a notion not traditionally
thought to have foundations in social science.3 8
The empirics of Brandeis Briefs suggest that the Court pays attention
to amici because they provide good informational inputs for its policy
choice. Indeed, legal scholars have confirmed this hypothesis. In their em-
pirical study of amicus briefs before the Court, Professors Joseph Kearney
and Thomas Merrill tested the influence of amici against three models of
judicial behavior-the legal model, the attitudinal model, and the interest-
group model.39  The legal model suggests that judges are interested in
getting the case right, and the authors hypothesized that a judge operating
under the legal model "should be receptive to 'Brandeis Brief'-type infor-
mation that sheds light on the wider social implications of the decision."40
While their observations about the influence of amicus briefs on the Court
suggested some support for the attitudinal and interest-group models, on the
whole they interpreted their "results as providing the most support for the
legal model." 4 1
Anecdotal evidence for the informational value of amicus briefs
abounds. Justice Breyer has been an outspoken advocate of the informa-
tional benefits of amicus participation in particularly complex areas of law
and in questions that implicate technical or scientific issues. 42  Surveys of
35. See Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REv. 197, 203 (2000) (noting that the introduction of nonlegal
material at the appellate stage "has been done since the early twentieth century, when Louis
Brandeis submitted his brief in Muller v. Oregon").
36. Id at 199 & n.12.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Margolis, supra note 14, at 230 (asserting that the Supreme Court relied on empirical
studies that indicated segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to ... status in the
community that may affect . . . hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone" to support the
decision in Brown).
39. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 748-49.
40. Id at 778.
41. Id at 816.
42. In a media interview, Justice Breyer said that amicus briefs containing technical information
"'play an important role in educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to
make us not experts but educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality of our
2011] 1253
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judges, Justices, and clerks confirm that among the most helpful "briefs are
those filed in technical cases by industry experts having a familiarity with
the specialized legal issues at stake.' The more sensitive and complex the
regulated system, the more help experts and professors can provide gener-
alist judges. Systems like the environment and economic competition fall
in this category.
But the informational model of amicus participation is not the only one
with traction; amicus briefs can also signal to the Court the number and
kind of supporters a rule has. And the courts do seem to be influenced by
this aspect of amicus participation, lending support to the affected groups'
model of judging under the influence of amici.4 Some judges are highly
critical of this use of amici. Judge Richard Posner has repeatedly rejected
motions for leave to file as amicus curiae, saying that the amicus brief
should not be a vehicle for groups to signal their political preference to the
court.45 In one instance denying such a motion, he said, "Essentially, the
proposed amicus briefs merely announce the 'vote' of the amici on the deci-
sion of the appeal. But, as I have been at pains to emphasize in contrasting
the legislative and judicial processes, they have no vote.'4 6  Judge Posner
has also complained about another effect of using amicus briefs to register
policy preferences: the irksome "me too" phenomenon that occurs when
amici pile on briefs that do not introduce new information or arguments. 47
decisions."' Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1998, at A17.
43. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae
Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 41 (2004); see also Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an
Amicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS, 279, 281 & n.14 (1999) (observing that expertise can be a
benefit offered by amici and giving an example from the New Mexico Supreme Court involving the
apportionment of water rights).
44. For defenses of this political use of amicus participation, see Garcia, supra note 17, at 317
("The amicus brief is a form of speech and petition, to which the courts should give due
consideration."), and Simmons, supra note 13, at 190 ("[T]he political symbolism of amicus curiae
participation reassures the public ... of the Court's democratic character.").
45. For a discussion of Judge Posner's attitude towards amicus participation and his hostility's
influence on other federal judges, see Garcia, supra note 17, at 326-30.
46. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2003).
47. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the
arguments made in the litigants' briefs, in effect merely extending the length of the litigant's brief.
Such amicus briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse."). Ostensibly, Supreme Court Rule
37 allows only amicus filings that "bring[] to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already
brought to its attention by the parties [that] may be of considerable help to the Court." But the
trouble is getting someone to go through the briefs in order to determine whether it meets this
standard, thereby defeating the time-saving aim of the rule. See Garcia, supra note 17, at 325.
Professor Stephen Calkins takes a positive perspective on redundant amicus briefs, extolling their
ability to provide "special emphasis" to an aspect of an antitrust case. Calkins, The Antitrust
Conversation, supra note 7, at 638-43.
1254 [Vol. 89:1247
HeinOnline  -- 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1254 2010-2011
Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act
For better or worse, the Court does seem to be affected by signals of
policy preferences from amici.48 But Merrill and Kearney found that
identity, not number, of a party's supporters had the strongest influence on
the Court. 49  Unsurprisingly, Kearney and Merrill showed that among all
amici, the Solicitor General had the strongest influence on the Court,50 but
states, the NAACP, 5' and the ACLUS2 all seemed to enjoy the Court's ear.
And any amicus curiae can boost its credibility with the Court by taking a
position contrary to its apparent interests or from teaming up with an odd
bedfellow to file a brief jointly. When an amicus goes against the Court's
expectation, it is harder for the Court to dismiss the amicus brief as self-
interested lobbying.
II. When the Court Uses Amici for Economic Arguments, It Acts Like an
Agency ... Almost.
When the Supreme Court relies on amici for economic arguments in
deciding an antitrust case, it acts like an agency soliciting comments on a
proposed rulemaking. 54  Interested parties-but not parties to a concrete,
litigable dispute-are asked to present evidence and arguments relevant to a
policy issue. Both decision makers consider the information they receive
and justify their ultimate decisions against criticisms leveled in the
comments. Seen in this way, Supreme Court antitrust adjudication begins
to look more like administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking than it
does a judicial appeal.
48. See Garcia, supra note 17, at 340-41 ("Amicus briefs have played an important role in
communicating the views of social movements to the courts in numerous cases.").
49. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 801, 811 (finding that while the total number of
briefs on a side was not correlated with success, briefs filed by the Solicitor General and other
institutional filers significantly affected outcomes).
50. Id. at 803-04. For a broader discussion of the Solicitor General's participation as amicus
curiae, see Simmons, supra note 13, at 211-14.
51. Lynch, supra note 43, at 50 (reporting that 11% of Supreme Court clerks responding to the
survey said that the NAACP's amicus briefs "always receive closer attention"). The NAACP's
influence with the Court has been long-standing. The group filed an amicus brief as early as 1915
in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
52. Id at 49 (reporting that 33% of Supreme Court clerks responding to survey said that they
gave the ACLU's amicus briefs more consideration).
53. See Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, supra note 7, at 628-31 (discussing examples of
"an important antitrust repeat playing tak[ing] an unpredicted position").
54. Cf Garcia, supra note 17, at 338-40 (explaining that in cases involving administrative
rules, amici briefs provide an opportunity for interested parties to comment on administrative
rulemaking, and that amicus participation in statutory cases can perform a similar function in cases
interpreting statutes).
12552011]
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A. Similarities
1. The procedures are the same.-Congress authorizes the Supreme
Court to regulate competition by giving it the last word on what the
Sherman Act means. Thus, the Sherman Act is to the Supreme Court as
an organic statute is to an administrative agency-both a mandate and a
constraint. The Act's language is broad and imprecise; it is a significant
delegation of authority.56 And since a dozen petitions for certiorari raising
antitrust issues are filed each year57 and the Court takes only one or two of
these,58 it has some discretion in setting its antitrust agenda, if not quite the
unfettered discretion an agency enjoys in considering areas for rulemaking
under § 553 of the APA.59
The involvement of amici completes the metaphor. When the Supreme
Court grants certiorari in an antitrust case, it announces its intention to allo-
cate rights and resources under the broad mandate of the Sherman Act.
This announcement is like an agency's notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPR), with an important difference. In both cases, the decision maker in-
vites those who believe they have a stake in the outcome to present
evidence supporting their side. But when the Court grants certiorari, it an-
nounces merely its intention to resolve a dispute, not its proposed
resolution. 6 0 The imprecision of the certiorari-as-NPR metaphor may have
important implications since parties commenting on a rule making may
have more information about the agency's regulatory inclination than an
amicus does about the Court's.
Despite the imperfect fit, the similarities between certiorari and NPR
are striking: like the comment period, the time between grant of certiorari
and close of briefing gives third parties an opportunity to weigh in much
55. See Nat'1 Soc'y ofProf'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining how
Congress never intended to provide the full meaning of the Sherman Act but rather authorized the
courts to give meaning to the statute by drawing on common law tradition).
56. See Arthur S. Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA. L.
REV. 23, 23, 30 (1956) (explaining that Congress's use of ambiguous statutory language is
purposeful in order to delegate interpretation authority to the courts).
57. See Thomas G. Hungar & Ryan G. Koopmans, Appellate Advocacy in Antitrust Cases:
Lessons from the Supreme Court, 23 ANTITRUST 53, 53 (2009) ("From September 2002 to October
2008, 94 petitions were filed that presented issues of antitrust law .... ).
58. Id. (stating that out of 94 petitions concerning antitrust law issues, "the Court granted
certiorari in only ten, a rate of less than 11 percent").
59. See LAWSON, supra note 28, at 195-96 (describing the minimal restrictions on informal
agency rulemaking under the APA).
60. In this way, the Court's grant of certiorari is more like an agency's announcement that a
certain issue is on its agenda-these notices are published semi-annually in the Unified
Agenda of Federal Regulation. Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation
ofAmerican Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 761-62 (1996).
1256 [Vol. 89:1247
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like the comment period in an administrative rulemaking. Without amici,
the Court would be limited to considering two perspectives on the proposed
economic policy. But with the benefit of amici, the Court can consider
sometimes dozens of different perspectives on the issue, in the same way
that the comment period allows agencies the benefit of many opinions and
arguments about a rule.
Once the amici have spoken and the briefing period ends, the Court
hears oral argument, makes its decision, and writes an opinion explaining
and justifying the new antitrust rule. The opinion resembles the statement
of basis and purpose that an agency is obliged to publish after issuing a
final rule. 6 1 In fact, the drafters of the APA probably had judicial opinions
62in mind when they created the statement of basis and purpose requirement.
Unlike the Court writing an opinion, an agency is required by law to
respond to major objections in its statement of basis and purpose. 63  But
even without this hard requirement, the Court's antitrust opinions often
address counterarguments from amicus briefs. One might expect the Court
to cherry-pick from the amicus briefs the arguments and data most suppor-
tive of their opinion and discuss only counterarguments that appear in the
parties' briefs. But in recent antitrust jurisprudence, the Court has spent
more time discussing the amicus briefs on the losing side than on the
winning side. This suggests that the Court feels an agency-like
responsibility to consider all the perspectives before it.
2. The players are the same.-Amicus curiae means "friend of the
court," and indeed the original idea seemed to be that these third parties
would be nonpartisan sources of information that might direct the court to
the objectively correct decision." That naive view has given way to the
realistic perspective-now taken for granted-that amici are more "friends
of a party" than "friends of the court.",6  Although in formal filings the
61. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). For a discussion of the statement and purpose rule, see LAWSON,
supra note 28, at 280-83.
62. See LAWSON, supra note 28, at 280 (comparing the statement and purpose rule to a judicial
opinion).
63. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 1023 (2009); see also, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 722
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("An agency need not address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned
manner to those that raise significant problems.").
64. Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and Their Friends, 1790-
1890, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 111, 111 (2003). The term comes from Roman law, under which "the
amicus, at the court's discretion, provided information on areas of law beyond the expertise of the
court." Lowman, supra note 16, at 1248.
65. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 704 ("The Supreme Court of the United States makes no
pretense of such disinterestedness on the part of 'its friends.' The amicus is treated as a potential
litigant in future cases, as an ally of one of the parties, or as the representative of an interest not
12572011]
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amicus curiae moniker has remained, in opinion writing the Court has all
but dropped the "curiae." So when a Justice uses the now-popular phrase
"respondents and their amici" he makes no bones about who is friends with
whom.66
This evolution from friends of the court to friends of the parties need
not be a bad thing. As long as the potential biases of the amicus are clear, a
Justice can take its arguments and evidence with a grain of salt. 7  This
procedure of discounting the value of an argument by the bias of its author
is, after all, inherent to the adversarial process. 8 The trouble, of course, is
making the biases clear. If a party can hide self-interest behind the ostensi-
ble neutrality of a friend of the court, then a Justice will not perform the
appropriate discounting. The Court probably had this problem in mind
when, well after it lost its innocence about who were its "friends," it
amended the amicus curiae rules to require a disclosure statement at the
beginning of any amicus brief stating the author's interest and relationship
to the parties. 69  Now judges and Justices simply assume that filing an
amicus brief is a self-interested act. 70
otherwise represented." (citation omitted)). Or, in the words of then-judge Samuel Alito, "an
amicus who makes a strong but responsible presentation in support of a party can truly serve as the
court's friend." Neonatology Assocs., PA, v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002).
66. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3248 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[P]etitioners and their amici...."); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010)
("Municipal respondents and their amici . . . .").
67. This is perhaps the reason why some of the most powerful briefs in antitrust cases are
those in which the author advocates a position apparently contradictory to its interests. For
example, amici briefs of the United States, though always influential, take on a particular
persuasiveness when they support an antitrust defendant in the Supreme Court. "Attention is
drawn any time an important antitrust repeat player takes an unpredicted position. No court can
lightly dismiss an amicus filing by the Antitrust Division, the FTC, or the states that recommends a
resolution against their litigating interests." Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, supra note 7, at
628.
68. Rejecting Judge Posner's criticism of partisan amicus briefs, then-Judge Alito wrote that
bias among amici comports with "the fundamental assumption of our adversary system that strong
(but fair) advocacy on behalf of opposing views promotes sound decision making." Neonatology
Associates, 293 F.3d at 131.
69. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 766. The Court amended its formal rules on amicus
participation in 1997 to require each nongovernment-authored amicus brief to "indicate whether
counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief, and [I] identify
every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made such monetary
contribution." SUP. CT. R. 37.6.
70. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not a single
amicus brief was filed in support of petitioner. That is no surprise. There is no self-interested
organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts. The expectation is,
however, that this Court will have that interest prominently-indeed, primarily-in mind."). This
attitude is widespread. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in
Federal Court: A Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, andAdversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 700, 708-
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The authors of notice-and-comment rulemaking probably never went
through the naYve stage of believing that third-party comments might come
from selfless experts whose only interest was in helping the agency get it
"right." In its 1947 Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Department of Justice anticipated that comments would come from
"interested persons." 71 So as the Court's attitude towards amicus briefs has
become more jaded, it has approached the typical agency's view of
comments made during informal rulemaking.
In the same way that courts do not decide an antitrust case by tallying
up the amici on either side, comment collection during agency rulemaking
is not the same as putting the rule to a vote-agencies must respond to ma-
terial comments, but they need not be swayed by the fact that a majority of
interested parties favor one outcome.7 2 In this way, both administrative
rulemaking and judicial decision making are less political than legislative
proceedings, even if we grant that comments and amicus briefs come from
politically motivated parties.
B. Differences-the Court's Hybrid Falls Short of Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking
The analogy between antitrust adjudication in the Supreme Court and
agency rulemaking is imperfect in salient ways. First, amici's arguments
are constrained by the existence of named parties to the dispute. Second,
the Supreme Court lacks the expertise that would allow an agency to parse
theoretical economic arguments and interpret data critically. Third, Justices
have no obligation to respond to amicus briefs-indeed they don't even
have to read them. Finally, and somewhat ironically, Supreme Court deci-
sions are not subject to judicial review. These differences mean the Court's
rulemaking lacks both the informational benefits and the procedural protec-
tions of notice-and-comment rulemaking. If we think the APA has
improved agency decision making, then we should be worried about ways
in which Supreme Court antitrust policy making falls short of the APA's
requirements.
1. Fewer Perspectives.-In its simplest form, a legal dispute in our
adversarial system is polar: two sides represent opposed interests and each
09 (2008) (reporting that the majority of surveyed federal court judges and Justices consider an
amicus curiae's financial relationship to a litigant when deciding whether to grant leave to file).
71. LAWSON, supra note 28, at 240.
72. See Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming
that agencies must respond to comments that are "relevant and significant"); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (clarifying that an agency is not
obliged to issue rules that comply with the position adopted by the majority of comments).
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seeks to win the case. This structure is thought to ensure vigorous repre-
sentation of the interests at stake.73 In the traditional domain of the
common law, this structure makes sense. Rights relating to property,
contract, and tort can be easily conceived of as resolving a struggle between
two individuals with conflicting interests. But for creating large-scale pub-
lic policy-where the interests at stake are myriad, complex, and
technical-this dialectic structure of adjudication makes less sense.74
Crafting a new antitrust rule is a complex optimization problem in
which economic theory and data are used to maximize the undefined
"welfare" of a class of people that includes literally everyone: "consumers."
But the parties to a Supreme Court antitrust case are usually only two, and
often neither can credibly claim to represent the consumer.7 Naturally, a
party only presents economic theory or data if it furthers its own litigation
strategy. This leaves a lot of economics out of parties' briefs, either be-
cause it is too complicated to be effective in swaying the Justices (as
opposed to more familiar modes of argument like parsing precedent or
statutes) or because the data or theory support a third position that benefits
neither side.
In theory, the use of amici can ameliorate this problem. They can
present a third (and fourth and fifth) perspective on the dispute, even
suggesting an outcome not advocated by either side. And filing an amicus
curiae brief is a way for an expert with all the right information but without
the legally protectable interest to present economic evidence. Concern
about the lack of consumers' representation and about inadequate efficiency
arguments from the parties' briefs probably accounts for some of the
Court's attention paid to amicus briefs. And it certainly would explain the
attention paid to the Solicitor General, whose briefs have the technical
savvy and pro-consumer focus of the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division. And since it is the Court's practice to allow all amicus briefing,
then the Court could, in theory, get the same variety of perspectives that an
agency enjoys during the comment period.
73. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("The paramount importance of vigorous
representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system ofjustice.").
74. See John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST.
CoMMENT. 69, 109 (2008) ("[T]he judicial process has trouble capturing the multiple perspectives
that best map reality, because in some cases there may be more plausible positions than there are
litigants.").
75. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 761, 771 (2005) ("The usual complainant about a sales practice is not a consumer, who
generally has little to gain from even a successful proceeding, but a competitor of the seller who is
employing the practice.").
76. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 738 (1964) ("This court has recognized the
power of federal courts to appoint 'amici to represent the public interest in the administration of
justice."' (quoting Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 581 (1946)).
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But the number of amicus briefs that the Court receives in a case is
typically a fraction of the number of comments an agency receives during a
rulemaking.7 7  This observation has several possible explanations. First,
although it is the Court's practice to give permission to all amicus
participation, it is free to deny it. In contrast, an agency engaged in § 553
rulemaking must allow any interested party an opportunity to comment on
the agency's proposed rule. If the Court can refuse to accept an amicus
brief (and in the early part of the New Deal, it was the Court's practice to
not accept amicus briefs), some groups may fear being perceived by the
Court as unqualified to argue before the court or as representing fringe in-
terests and so will not invest in writing a brief.
Second, amicus argument must conform to the format of a legal brief
and any additional requirements Rule 37 imposes. 7 9 This means that writ-
ing an amicus brief without a lawyer is taking an unadvisable risk that your
submission will appear amateurish. Legal writing takes time, and a
lawyer's time takes money, typically enough to dwarf the fee for filing an
amicus brief with the court in the first place.80 And the brief must be filed
according to the Court's byzantine filing procedures.8 1 Details matter; even
slight deviations from the conventional font, color, or weight of page can
mean your brief is not read.82 In contrast, comments on a proposed
rulemaking can take any form and are often made online.83  Ironically,
courts cite the openness of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a reason for
greater judicial deference when a rule is challenged in court.
77. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 14, at 754 (discussing the increase in the mean number
of amicus briefs per case from about .50 in the late 1940s to 4.23 in the 1990s); Stuart Shapiro,
Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process under the Clinton and Bush (43)
Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 404-05 (2007) (comparing the number of comments federal
agencies received on rules under both the Clinton and Bush administrations). For example, in a
typical EPA case from the 1980s the agency received 192 comments raising 400 issues.
RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCESS 329 (5th ed. 2009).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
79. SUP. CT. R. 37.
80. And this cost is incurred even if the Court ultimately denies the party the right to file. "It is
awkward, to say the least, to bill a client for a brief the court refuses to accept." Munford, supra
note 43, at 282.
81. See SUP. CT. R. 37 (indicating various requirements for the filing of amicus curiae briefs).
82. See SUP. CT. R. 33 (listing specific color, font, and weight requirements for different types
of documents submitted to the Court); see also Lynch, supra note 43, at 44 (reporting clerks' bias
against amicus briefs with even minor variations from the Court's paper weight and font
requirements).
83. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 118-19 (2008).
84. See, e.g., Nat'l Petroleum Refiners' Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(observing that rulemaking opens up agency policy making to a broader range of criticism and
advice than adjudication); cf also CROLEY, supra note 83, at 118 ("Formally[] at least, rulemaking
is open and inclusive, and parties can participate on their own initiative and directly with the
agency.").
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Not only are the numbers of participants lower in Supreme Court
adjudication than in agency rulemaking, but also the spectrum of ideas and
opinions put before the Court is likely to be more limited. Although they
are not required to declare their support for one of the parties in the case,85
most amici filing with the Court, including the Solicitor General, do.86 This
is probably because amicus briefs are often solicited by one side of an anti-
trust dispute. And, even if a lawyer prepares a brief without prompting
from either side, he is trained to see disputes as having two sides.87
Moreover, from a rhetorical perspective, preserving the appearance of a
two-sided debate makes sense, since the record and briefs from the lower
court proceedings frame the issues as binary.88 Justices, themselves lawyers
trained in dialectic argument, are likely to consider each argument as
cutting one way or another. 89  A good lawyer is loath to be seen by the
Court as complicating the issues. So even if amici represent diverse per-
spectives on a case, all filing parties on a given side have incentives to
downplay differences of opinion in order to conform to the adversarial
model of litigation.
Amicus briefs sometimes provide good economic arguments, but the
Court must take them as it gets them.90 In contrast, agency rulemaking can
involve active investigation into an issue.9' Comments made during a rule-
making can inform an agency's decision, but the agency is by no means
limited to those comments as informational inputs. An agency can solicit
85. See Sup. CT. R. 37.2(a) (setting forth the filing requirements for amicus briefs but not
explicitly requiring briefs to support one side or the other). In Leegin, two economists filing as
amici refused to take sides. See Brief for William S. Comanor & Frederic M. Scherer as Amici
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173679; see also McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 74, at 109
("[T]he judiciary permits amicus briefs to represent positions different from those advanced by the
plaintiff or defendant.").
86. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 740 (9th ed. 2007).
87. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 244
(2003) (observing that American lawyers are trained to argue for their clients rather than for the
"best" overall resolution).
88. Professor Horowitz makes the broader point that "amici do not have the ability to shape the
issues or the factual record . . . amicus participation so often begins on appeal, after the record is
frozen." DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 44 n.56 (1977).
89. See KAGAN, supra note 87, at 244.
90. Technically, the Court can request amicus participation, but it usually only uses this power
to ask the Solicitor General to file a brief. See Garcia, supra note 17, at 323 (noting that federal
courts have the power to request amicus briefs and that the Supreme Court regularly invites the
Solicitor General to submit them).
91. See LAWSON, supra note 28, at 8-9 (explaining that agencies spend most of their time
"analyzing, investigating, synthesizing, deliberating, planning, and studying").
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data and opinions through a notice of proposed inquiry.9 2 And it can con-
duct hearings, depose experts, or conduct its own studies on the structure of
competition. 9 3  But the Court lacks these powers and gets only a limited
opportunity to ask questions directly of the parties during oral argument.
Amici (with the exception of the Solicitor General) cannot participate, 9 4 So
the Court cannot ask clarifying questions about an amicus brief's technical
economic arguments.
2. Inexpert Court.-The Supreme Court is comprised of generalist
Justices without any particular training in industrial organization. 9 5 None of
the current Justices has an economics degree, even at the undergraduate
level. As in all areas of law that require technical savvy, they rely on the
parties to present data and theory in easy-to-understand ways, which, even
when done well, tend toward oversimplification. On the other hand, anti-
trust economics may be presented at too high a level, leaving federal judges
to despair in their ability to assimilate economic principles into their
decisions.96
92. The FCC frequently uses this means of gathering information, a precursor to a proposed
rulemaking. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (mandating the Commission to initiate a notice of
inquiry concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans).
93. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 946 (5th ed. 2010)
(explaining that administrative agencies are not significantly limited in their ability to consider
various legislative facts).
94. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME
COURT (8th ed. 2002) (explaining that since 1980 efforts of private amici to participate in arguments
have seldom been successful, while the Court is more liberal to the Solicitor General and
representatives of states); see also FED. R. APP. P. 29 (allowing amici oral argument only with court
approval).
95. Although the Court is comprised of generalists and any Justice can write an opinion about
anything, often the Justices informally specialize in an area of law, either because of expertise or
interest. This is not the case in the last ten years of antitrust jurisprudence. Of the three Justices
who have written more than one opinion (majority, concurrence, or dissent) in a substantive
antitrust case, no one stands out as having written a particularly large share. Justice Breyer has
written three opinions. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1123-25
(2008) (Breyer, J., concurring); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007);
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Justice Stevens has written
four opinions. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Credit Suisse,
551 U.S. at 285-87 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 182-88 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). And Justice Thomas has written three. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 287-90
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
96. See Findings and Recommendations of the Antitrust Modernization Commission: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of Jonathan R. Yarowsky,
Vice Chair, Antitrust Modernization Commission), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/1 10th/35243.PDF (observing that judges "were particularly daunted by the economics" in
antitrust cases).
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Agencies, on the other hand, can be staffed by experts with education,
research, and experience that help them understand technical arguments
affecting policy decisions.97  Moreover, these qualifications mean that they
can actually conduct studies themselves to answer scientific questions rele-
vant to regulation. 98 Independent agencies have perhaps the most potential
as scientifically sophisticated decision-making bodies, since they are more
shielded from political flux than their executive counterparts.9 9 But even
executive agencies enjoy insulation from political whim since only the top-
level officers rotate with a change in administration. And both executive
and independent agencies have access to nonpartisan scientific perspectives
through their use of advisory committees.100 These committees are com-
prised of working scientists who are not formally employed by the
government at all. This is not to say that an agency's scientific perspective
is always nonpartisan; gone are the days of lauding agency staff as neutral
technocrats without political preferences.' 0 But even if those administra-
tors have partisan leanings they also have superior education in and
exposure to their field than do judges.
3. No Obligation to Read and Respond-An agency "must respond in
a reasoned manner" to comments made on a proposed rule that "raise
significant problems."' 0 2  Although the meaning of "reasoned" and
"significant" is the subject of much debate, it is clear that an agency has at
least some duty to attend to arguments made during the comment period.
Justices are under no such obligation to consider amici's arguments.
97. For a discussion of the relatively high quality of agency science, see Wendy E. Wagner, The
"Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and
Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 73-79 (Autumn 2003).
98. For a discussion of how "consensus" of experts should be measured by agencies, see Adrian
Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231 (2009).
99. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation
of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2000) (stating that independent
agencies are independent of the political will of the Executive Branch). This justification for
agency decision making has its roots in the progressive movement and the creation of the FTC, see
id at 1131-32 (noting that during the progressive era, expertise and independence were thought to
"safeguard the commissions from partisan politics"), but it continues to have traction today. See
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3174 (2010) (observing
"the constitutional legitimacy of a justification that rests agency independence upon the need for
technical expertise").
100. See 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:53, at 547 (3d
ed. 2010) (describing the use of scientific committees which must be fairly balanced and represent
divergent interests with regard to the subject matter).
101. For this antiquated view, see works by Joseph Eastman and James Landis excerpted in
LAWSON, supra note 28, at 25. For the modem understanding that agency decisions are influenced
by specific industry interests instead of concern for public wellbeing, see Rachel Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15, 21-24 (2010).
102. Reytblatt v. U.S. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Whether and how carefully Justices even read amicus briefs varies greatly
by Justice, as does the extent to which clerks are expected to inform a
Justice about amicus arguments.' 0 3 Unlike the parties' briefs, at least some
amicus briefs probably do not get read at all.o 4
Again, the lack of oral argument hurts third parties' ability to influence
the Court. If the Court has not read an amicus brief, then at least oral ar-
gument could be an opportunity for its author to present its arguments. But
the convention against allowing third parties to participate in oral
argument105 means that unless the parties' advocates choose to bring up the
content of an amicus brief, it is a dead letter. And even if the Justices have
read an amicus brief, they cannot ask questions about the often highly tech-
nical arguments directly to its author. Instead, the parties' lawyers have to
become fluent in their amici's science, which is difficult given the time
constraints on a noneconomist lawyer preparing for oral argument.
Even though Justices writing antitrust opinions seem to feel some
obligation to respond to counterarguments in amicus briefs, they are not
strictly obligated to do so. There are no requirements about what a judicial
opinion must say, but a statement of basis and purpose must meet certain
requirements designed to facilitate judicial review. 10 6 While a Justice will
only address a counterargument from an amicus brief if he feels it rhetori-
cally strengthens the opinion, an agency must thoroughly respond to
dissenters. The level of detail required of these ostensibly "concise and
general" statements has multiplied with the evolution of the "arbitrary and
capricious" to become a "searching and careful" standard. 07  A typical
statement of basis and purpose can be as long as 1,600 pages,os while the
typical Supreme Court opinion is shorter by two orders of magnitude.
103. See Lynch, supra note 43, at 43-45 (describing the process by which Supreme Court
clerks review amicus briefs).
104. Justice Ginsburg has said "that her clerks often divide the amicus briefs into three piles:
those that should be skipped entirely, those that should be skimmed, and those that should be read in
full." Simard, supra note 70, at 688.
105. See FED. R. APP. P. 29 (allowing amici oral argument only with court approval);
Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 63, at 992 ("[T]hird parties generally cannot participate in oral
argument.").
106. See Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 625 (2006) ("The exigencies judicially imposed on the writing of the
statement of a rule by an American IRA seem to be unparalleled."); Strauss, supra note 60, at 757
("[An] agency would be well advised to write its statement of basis and purpose in a manner clearly
demonstrating the factual basis for and reasonableness of its judgments, and that it had taken a 'hard
look' at any matters that had proved controversial.").
107. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
108. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 77, at 329; see also Strauss, supra note 60, at 760.
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4. No Judicial Review.-When the Supreme Court makes antitrust
policy, its decision is final in a way that an agency's is not. When an
agency regulates, the substance of the rule and the procedures for making it
can be challenged in a suit. To be sure, agency decisions are not subject to
judicial review as a matter of course. Someone with standing must bring
suit in court alleging that the rule or the process to create it was illegal. In
this sense, judicial review is ad hoc. 09 But even if administrators cannot
know for sure that their rule will be challenged, the possibility of a suit
likely influences rulemaking. "[A]gency decisionmaking inevitably takes
place in the shadow of judicial review."o
But nobody has power to review a Supreme Court's decision-at least
formally. Informally, Congress can override a bad Supreme Court rule in a
nonconstitutional context, such as interpretations of the Sherman Act, by
passing a bill that contradicts the decision's effect. In practice, Congress
rarely abrogates a Supreme Court Sherman Act decision, either because of
the high political costs of doing so or simple inertia."
Apart from concerns about separation of powers, there is a very
practical reason why we might want a second pair of eyes on the Court's
antitrust decisions. In a typical Supreme Court case, the Justices are at least
the second (and usually the third) body to consider the evidence behind a
decision. But because of the unusual amount of economic theory and data
that is presented for the first time in Supreme Court amicus briefs, the Court
is often the first-and the last-body to review it. Often the amici's eco-
nomics were not presented at trial, where it would have been subject to the
rigors of Daubert.1 12 And often the economic arguments presented to the
Supreme Court by amici did not appear even at the court of appeals level.' 13
109. CROLEY, supra note 83, at 99.
110. Id.
111. Lance McMillan, The Proper Role of Courts: The Mistakes of Leegin, 2008 Wis. L. REV.
405, 457 n.246 ("[L]egislative inertia often makes it difficult to overrule even unpopular
decisions."). But see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)).
112. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Garcia, supra note 17, at 352-55;
cf Simmons, supra note 13, at 190 n.12 ("[E]vidence and arguments presented in amicus briefs ...
have not been challenged through the litigation process and are not subject to the same evidentiary
safeguards as the parties' briefs.").
113. The D.C. Circuit criticized the Court's willingness to attend to an amicus's Johnny-come-
lately arguments, albeit in the administrative law context:
I recognize that the Supreme Court has moved pretty far from traditional notions of
judicial restraint that confine courts to issues presented by the parties, but I think this
decision represents another large step in that regrettable process insofar as it was an
amicus-an amicus who had not appeared until the case reached the Supreme Court-
who made the dispositive argument, one which was never once made before us.
Akins v. FEC, 146 F.3d 1049, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
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One might hope the inexpert Court's best understanding of economic theory
would get at least a proofread.
Judicial review of agency action can be quite searching and
substantive. Courts invalidate rules and decisions because the agency did
not consider relevant facts or alternative regulatory outcomes.l 14 To a re-
viewing court, red flags may include an abrupt change in policy in response
to political pressure, or asymmetrical attention to various represented
interests. Professor Steven Croley argues that these filters serve the
commendable purpose of impeding "easy agency delivery of regulatory
rents."' 15  Besides thwarting rent seeking, judicial review can catch
scientific errors.1 16
C. Relying on Amici Sacrifices the Benefits of the Justiciability Doctrine
The Court's reliance on amici in antitrust adjudication is a trade-off. On
the one hand, it allows the Court to consider more and better economic
arguments than it could without amicus participation, even if it falls short of
what an agency can do. On the other hand, it may sacrifice some of the
epistemological benefits of the legal approach to decision making. The sac-
rifice is probably worth it; at least one scholar is emphatic that, at least in
antitrust cases, the Court is better off with amici than without them."' But
even if the current hybrid is an improvement upon a pure Article III model of
judicial decision making, the hybrid has problems. A complete picture of
those problems involves understanding not only how the hybrid falls short of
agency decision making but also how it sacrifices the benefits of strict
adherence to standing requirements.
Article III of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on federal courts
only when they are presented with a live case or controversy.' This re-
quirement prevents courts from resolving disputes between nonadverse
parties or parties without a tangible stake in the outcome and disputes in-
volving merely speculative injury. In the antitrust context, the Court has
further narrowed standing with its notion of "antitrust injury"-a stricter,
114. CROLEY, supra note 83, at 100.
115. Id.
116. See Wagner, supra note 97, at 81 ("Courts ... provide valuable oversight of the quality of
agency science through their review of rulemakings and by ensuring that interested parties have an
opportunity to comment on proposed regulations.").
117. See Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, supra note 7, at 658 ("The antitrust law that we
know and apply is almost certainly richer and different because of the active participation of
amici.").
118. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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more specific requirement of harm than would satisfy constitutional
limitations on standing." 9
Limitations on justiciability serve both epistemological and political
ends. First, they ensure that the legal rule is derived from a complete
factual record of actually conflicting interests.120 With this concrete factual
context, a court can see the real-world effects of a statute or a rule and so
better determine whether it is legitimate or efficient. Justiciability require-
ments also promote separation of powers.121 Without a concrete factual
context, the Court would have to engage in speculation about the effect of
rules on interested parties, a role that more comfortably suits the politically
responsive branches of government.
The requirements of standing-injury, ripeness, and mootness-are, of
course, not imposed on amici.122 A party with an interest in the dispute that
falls short of the injury necessary to confer antitrust standing can get the
Court's attention by filing an amicus brief. In the context of interpreting
the Sherman Act, it makes sense for the Court to broaden the inputs to its
decision. The Act delegates authority to make broad economic policy to the
Court, and so the Court understandably seeks out the input of those affected
by regulation when they regulate. But it is important to consider what is
lost when the Court chooses to move away from the adjudicative model.
Without being able to ask of an amicus "what's it to you?," 2 3 the
Court may not be able to discount amici's economic arguments according to
how closely they serve their author's self-interest. It is true that the disclo-
sure statement and the convention of declaring support for one side or the
other give the Justices a hint as to a party's interest in a suit. But without a
cognizable legal interest at stake, an amicus's bias may not be clear even
from these disclosures.
This is especially true in the context of amici such as antitrust and
economics professors.124  The impulse of an academic to file an amicus
119. AtI. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). This higher bar for
antitrust standing comes from the remedial provision of the Clayton Act. See 111. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977) (holding that a pass-on theory could not be used offensively
by indirect purchasers).
120. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 73, 77 (2007).
121. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (arguing that standing doctrine is an
"inseparable element" of the principle of separation of powers "whose disregard will inevitably
produce-as it has during the past few decades-an overjudicialization of the process of self-
governance").
122. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.60(12) (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
123. Scalia, supra note 122, at 882.
124. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support
of the Petitioners, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (No. 07-
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brief with the Court has many potential sources. It might be an opportunity
to raise one's scholarly profile or build one's resume for consulting jobs. It
could be a political preference, the return of a favor, or an act of
collegiality. It might fulfill the professor's desire to see his scholarly
position vindicated by a Supreme Court opinion that adopts it. It might
even be an altruistic desire for the law to "get it right," as unlikely as this
appears to cynics. For the most part, scholars have little to lose by filing an
amicus brief, and this should worry the Court about its epistemological
value.
Perhaps even more problematic, however, are situations in which the
motivations of the amicus are all too clear. Many amici are firms with
equivalent financial interests as the party. For example, when the Supreme
Court declared that Verizon had no antitrust duty to deal with its
competitors,125 the decision impacted AT&T nearly as much as Verizon,
since all incumbent LLCs as the firms had equivalent financial interests. So
the two firms (and their successors in interest) took turns as parties and amici
in the telecom antitrust cases of the 2000s. Verizon was a party in Trinko1 2 6
and Twombly1 2 7 and amicus curiae in support of AT&T in LinkLine.128
AT&T was a party in Twombly and Linkline and amicus curiae in support of
Verizon in Trinko.129
Just because a firm has similar interests as a party and as an amicus
does not mean that it presents the same arguments in both roles. Allowing a
firm to argue through an amicus brief effectively reduces the cost of litiga-
tion for that party, altering its cost-benefit analysis when it decides between
aggressive or conservative arguments. An amicus curiae who is not legally
bound to pay treble damages to the plaintiff is naturally more inclined to
take risks in its argument.13 0 Nor is an amicus bound by the judgment under
res judicata (absent privity). '3  For example, an amicus might be willing to
512), 2007 WL 4132899; Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent, Nynex
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (No. 96-1570), 1998 WL 331176.
125. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
126. Id.
127. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
128. Brief for Verizon Communications, Inc. & National Association of Manufacturers as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109 (No. 07-512), 2008 WL 4154538.
129. Brief of AT&T Corp., Cavalier Telephone, and Competitive Telecommunications
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Verizon, 540 U.S. at 398 (No. 02-682),
2003 WL 21767975.
130. Professor Krislov observed that "[a]rguments that might anger the Justices, doctrines that
have not yet been found legally acceptable, and emotive presentations that have little legal standing
can best be utilized in most instances by the amicus rather than by the principals." Krislov, supra
note 21, at 712; see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 228 (discussing the use of risky emotive
argumentation in amicus briefs).
131. Lowman, supra note 16, at 1260-61.
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ask the Court to change the law, 132 but a party, faced with the threat of
treble damages, may find that strategy intolerably risky. A party's tactic is
likely to be more conservative, arguing for a narrow reading of precedent or
for dismissal on a jurisdictional ground.
The Court benefits from amici's risk taking. If the Sherman Act's
imperative is to optimize economic efficiency, then the Court should want
to encourage arguments about what behavior encourages competition. But
usually this kind of argument amounts to a request for a change in law.
Lower risk litigation strategies include applying or distinguishing precedent
or arguing for a flaw in the Court's jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the par-
ties emphasize these arguments, sometimes at the expense of more general
economic-efficiency arguments. But amici seem more comfortable focus-
ing on economic policy in their briefs, and so the Court benefits from them
not being as invested in the outcome as the party. But this very detachment
should raise concerns as well. As the Court moves away from a tradition-
ally adjudicative process, it sacrifices something of epistemological value:
arguments obtained only from firms forced to put their money where their
mouth is.
III. The Court's Recent Mistakes in Antitrust
The Supreme Court's reliance on amicus briefs for economics leads
them to make two kinds of mistakes. The first is substantive: because the
Justices misunderstand economic theory and data, they sometimes make
errors in their economic analysis. The second is procedural: without the right
mechanisms for gathering information, the Court sometimes makes decisions
without considering all the relevant data.
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate these two kinds of errors. In
each case, the Court was asked to reconsider long-standing interpretations
of the Sherman Act's proscriptions. Each decision required the Court to
engage broad questions of economic policy and to estimate the efficiencies
of the old rule. In both, the Court depended on amici to guide its
theoretical economic analysis and to provide a solid empirical foundation
for its decision. In both Linkline and Leegin, the amici's performance of
these tasks left something to be desired.
A. Linkline
In Linkline, the Supreme Court all but foreclosed Sherman Act liability
for "price squeezes," a basis of liability in Alcoa,3 3 one of the most famous
132. For example, the amici in Leegin openly asked the Court to overrule a century-old
precedent. See infra subpart III(B).
133. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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American antitrust cases of the twentieth century. A price squeeze occurs
when a vertically integrated firm, selling both wholesale inputs for manu-
facturing a product and the finished product itself, seeks to eliminate a rival
who also manufactures the product.13 4 If the rival relies on buying inputs
from the integrated firm, then the integrated firm can "squeeze" its com-
petitor out of the finished product market by raising the input price it
charges the rival and lowering the finished product price it charges to the
consumer.'35  The integrated firm adjusts these prices until the rival
manufacturer cannot afford to buy the inputs, manufacture the product, and
match the integrated firm's low retail price.13 6 The rival will (eventually)
go out of business, and with the rival manufacturer out of the picture, the
integrated firm can raise prices for the finished product and reap monopoly
profits. 137
Linkline, a provider of retail DSL service, alleged that AT&T offered
them DSL transmission service (an input for retail DSL) at a price too high
to allow Linkline to compete with AT&T's retail DSL prices to
consumers.' 38  Linkline could not obtain the transmission service from
someone else at a lower price because AT&T controls "the 'last mile'-the
lines that connect homes and businesses to the telephone network." 39 The
Federal Communications Commission, presumably in an effort to subvert
AT&T's natural monopoly, required AT&T to "provide wholesale 'DSL
transport' service to independent firms" as a condition to a recent merger.140
The Supreme Court reasoned that a price squeeze was actually two
allegations in one. First, Linkline was arguing that AT&T had an "antitrust
duty to deal" with it in the DSL transmission service market, for if AT&T
had a right not to deal at all with Linkline, surely Linkline could not com-
plain about the terms of the dealing.141 Second, the Court said, Linkline
accused AT&T of predatory pricing, for the only way low prices to con-
sumers can amount to monopolization under the Sherman Act is in the
context of predatory pricing.142 The Court analyzed these claims one at a
134. 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 141 (3d ed. 2008);
Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovencamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, 51
ARIz. L. REV. 273, 273 (2009).
135. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, at 141.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 274 (describing the traditional
model of a "price squeeze" considered by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa, which focused in part on
the fact that Alcoa's pricing would drive its manufacturing rivals out of business).
138. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009).
139. Id
140. Id
141. Id. at 1115-16.
142. Id. at 1116.
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time as "component[s]"l 4 3 of Linkline's claim. As for the allegedly "too-
high" wholesale price, the Court's opinion in Trinko made clear that an in-
cumbent telecom company, already regulated by the FCC, has no antitrust
duty to deal with competitor telecom providers.'" And, as for the allegedly
"too-low" prices that AT&T was charging to its retail DSL customers, be-
cause Linkline did not allege the elements necessary to state a predatory
pricing claim under Brooke Group,14 5 there could be no liability for the low
retail prices.146
The Linkline Court's two-component conception of a price squeeze is
incoherent. To begin with, the Court was unclear about the relationship
between the two components. If a price squeeze plaintiff needs to prove
both a duty to deal at the wholesale level and predatory pricing at the retail
level, then the Court should have clarified that there is no such thing as a
price squeeze under the Sherman Act-that is just what a competitor feels
when a monopolizer does two anticompetitive things at the same time.
Instead, the Court articulated its holding thus: "[No] price-squeeze
claim may be brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant is
under no antitrust obligation to sell the inputs to the plaintiff in the first
place." 4 7 So what happens when a defendant does have an antitrust duty to
deal with the plaintiff, as the court found in Aspen,148 its seminal duty-to-
deal case? Although the Linkline Court suggested that the answer had to do
with below-cost pricing, an economic analysis of the question reveals that
the answer should have nothing to do with predatory pricing. The
discussion of Brooke Group in the context of price squeezes is a non
sequitur.14 9
If there is a duty to deal, the integrated firm can squeeze its retail rival
without below-cost pricing, but how it does so depends on whether the mar-
ket for the finished product operates according to Bertrand or Cournot
143. Id. at 1119.
144. Id; Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410
(2004).
145. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
146. Predatory pricing claims brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act must meet two
requirements. First, the plaintiff must prove that its rival's prices are set "below an appropriate
measure of its rival's costs." Id. at 222. Second, the plaintiff must show that the predator had "a
dangerous probability" of recovering the losses incurred from selling at a below-market price. Id. at
224. The Court in Linkline found that the complaint contained "no allegation that AT&T's conduct
met either of the Brooke Group requirements." Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120.
147. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1115.
148. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
149. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Pacific Bell v. LinkLine: Price Squeezing and the Limits of
Judicial Administrobility, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 129, 135 (2008) (providing
an example of a lower court confusing the similar but distinct concepts of price squeezing and
predatory pricing).
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competition. If in the hourglass market the firms compete on price
(Bertrand), then the integrated firm can squeeze his rival by charging
anything above cost for the inputs. To see this, suppose Firm A has a
monopoly over the supply of sand, one of the inputs for its other business:
manufacturing hourglasses. A's cost of harvesting the sand is $1 per
hourglass. It uses some sand to make its own hourglasses (it sells the sand
to itself for $1) and sells some sand to a rival hourglass manufacturer,
Firm B. If A sells sand to B at the monopoly price, say $3 per hourglass,
and if both firms are equally efficient (they have the same average cost of
making an hourglass), A will drive B out of business. In Bertrand
competition, both firms will drop their price to marginal cost. With a
lower cost for the input, A will be able to drop its retail price lower than B
can, and B will be squeezed between a high input price and a low retail
price and have to exit.
If firms in the hourglass market compete by setting quantity (Cournot),
A might have to take an extra step to squeeze B, but still it need not drop
its product below any measure of cost.o50  Say that A can price its hour-
glasses above cost; perhaps the Cournot oligopoly price is $6. Again, the
firms are equally efficient at manufacturing hourglasses-it costs them each
$2 to make the finished product. The integrated firm makes a profit of $3
on each hourglass it sells (total cost = $1 + $2, revenue = $6). A can
charge B the monopoly price for sand ($3) and still not put B out of
business because B can turn a profit on its finished hourglasses, although
that profit will be smaller than A's ($1 instead of $3).
A will not be happy with the status quo because, with B around, the
Cournot oligopoly price is lower and A's market share is smaller. It will
want to drive B out by lowering its retail price, temporarily, to $4, which is
still above A's cost. Since B's costs are $5 per hourglass, it cannot profita-
bly compete with A's $4 price, and it will go out of business. After B
ceases to exist, A can raise its prices again to something more than $6.
A simpler way of saying the above is to say that if a firm has a duty to
deal with another firm, it must have a duty to deal on terms that allow the
rival to stay in business, or the duty has no meaning at all.'s So if the
Court had found AT&T obligated to deal with Linkline, it would have had
150. A similar result would obtain if above-cost profits in the retail industry existed not because
of a Cournot monopoly, but because the products were differentiated. Dennis W. Carlton, Should
"Price Squeeze" Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive Conduct?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 271, 275-76 (2008).
151. Cf Gregory J. Werden, Remedies for Exclusionary Conduct Should Protect and Preserve
the Competitive Process, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 65, 76 (2009) (describing the pervasive and continuing
duties a court or regulatory agency would have to take on in order to maintain an effective duty to
deal that actually preserves competition).
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to set the wholesale price of DSL transport service (and perhaps even the
retail price of DSL!) such that the gap between wholesale and retail prices
covered Linkline's costs. This calculation would have nothing to do with
Brooke Group's below-cost pricing or recoupment.152  Treating a price-
squeeze claim as a "step-one, step-two claim," while simple for a judge to
understand, misunderstands the economics of squeezes.
The Court's mistake was overzealous analogical reasoning, 153 perhaps
a forgivable mistake for Justices who trade in analogy, not economics. For
half of the analysis, the analogical technique worked. The Court was quite
right to note that if the integrated firm could refuse to deal with its down-
stream rival altogether, and thus put it out of business, then the downstream
rival cannot complain about a squeeze. 154  In this sense, a price-squeeze
claim is "like" a duty-to-deal claim.'55  But analogy gets the Court in
trouble later, when it reasons that any claim alleging low retail prices as
part of an anticompetitive scheme must be "like" predatory pricing and so
must meet the requirements of Brooke Group.15 6 The analogy is tempting-
a price squeeze resembles predatory pricing in that the monopolist sacrifices
profits temporarily in order to harm a competitor and then recoups those
losses (and then some) after the competitor fails and the monopolist can
raise prices. But the structure of a squeeze is more complicated, rendering
Brooke Group inapposite.
The author of the mistaken two-component conception of squeeze
claims was Judge Gould, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit opinion
below.157  He suggested that "the notion of a 'price squeeze' is itself in a
squeeze between two recent Supreme Court precedents," Trinko and Brooke
Group.'5 8  This image-snappy and vivid-resonated with the Court be-
cause it appealed to analogical and precedential reasoning, the domain of
legal thought.
152. To put the point yet another way: "In adjudicating predatory pricing claims, courts look to
whether the defendant priced its product below its own costs. Courts deciding price squeeze claims,
however, consider whether the defendant's pricing conduct reduced or eliminated the plaintiffs
profit margins." Vaheesan, supra note 150, at 140.
153. For a discussion of the importance of analogy in granting certiorari to antitrust issues, see
Hungar & Koopmans, supra note 57, at 55 (discussing analogies between Weyerhaeuser and
Brooke Group, Linkline, and Trinko).
154. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009); see Carlton,
supra note 151, at 276-77 (explaining the impact of a price squeeze when a duty to deal is, or is not,
present).
155. See Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1119 ("If AT&T had simply stopped providing DSL transport
service to the plaintiffs, it would not have run afoul of the Sherman Act.").
156. Id. at 1116.
157. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 885-88 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Gould, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 886.
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Judge Gould's quip also led to another mistake that only made it
harder for the Supreme Court to reject the analogy of squeeze as predatory
pricing. Because the plaintiffs believed their claim could meet the require-
ments of Brooke Group, they made an unusual tactical decision when
AT&T petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Linkline conceded
Judge Gould's point, and said it could, in fact, plead its case according to
Brooke Group's requirements. 15 9 Now, Linkline argued, the parties were
not adverse, the case was moot, and certiorari was inappropriate.160 The
Court rejected Linkline's claim of mootness,161 but its attention had been
drawn to the idea that Brooke Group might apply to squeeze cases, since
even the plaintiff concedes so!
Judge Gould's dissent might not have gained traction with the Court
were it not for the participation of amicus curiae at the certiorari and merits
stages of the Supreme Court case. Judge Gould and Linkline may have ini-
tiated the wrong turn in the analysis, but the amici guided the court further
down the mistaken path. Amici for AT&T pressed the price-squeeze-as-
predatory-pricing analogy in their briefs, even though AT&T itself did not
mention it, nor did it argue for Brooke Group analysis of squeezes. In both
of its amicus briefs, Verizon argued that plaintiffs could not succeed on
their squeeze theory without showing below-cost pricing for AT&T's retail
DSL service.162 Likewise, the Washington Legal Foundation and Abbott
Laboratories, as amici for AT&T, each pressed the application of Brooke
Group to the plaintiffs claim.' 63  Perhaps most devastatingly, the United
States organized its amicus brief in favor of AT&T around the "two
component" structure of price squeezes that the Court ultimately adopted in
organizing its analysis.'6
The Court does not directly cite amici for its two-component
conception of price squeezes, but there is ample evidence that the Court (or
159. See Brief for Respondents at 13, Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109 (No. 07-512), 2008 WL
4606588 (stating that the price-squeeze claim only survives if it can satisfy the requirements
of Brooke Group).
160. See Brief in Opposition at 2-4, Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109 (No. 07-512) 2007 WL
4458899 (arguing that a grant of certiorari is inappropriate because the Court has already
established controlling precedent and a circuit split does not exist).
161. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1117.
162. Brief for Verizon Communications Inc. & National Association of Manufacturers as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 129, at 15-16, 22.
163. Brief for Abbott Laboratories as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-13,
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109 (No. 07-512), 2008 WL 4154537; Brief of Washington Legal
Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109 (No.
07-512), 2008 WL 4154539 (arguing that plaintiffs must show predatory pricing under the
test provided by Brooke Group).
164. Brief for United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15-18, Linkline, 129 S.
Ct. 1109 (No. 07-512), 2008 WL 4125498.
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its clerks) read the amicus briefs carefully. The opinion's section on
mootness responded directly to COMPTEL's amicus brief, quoting from it
twice. 165  The Court considered and rejected an alternative to the two-
pronged inquiry, the "transfer price test," crediting the American Antitrust
Institute's and COMPTEL's amicus briefs for the notion.1 66 Likewise, the
Court considered and rejected AAI's argument that squeezes "raise entry
barriers that fortify the upstream monopolist's position."6  Additionally,
the final opinion bears such striking similarity to the brief for the United
States that it is implausible that the Court did not carefully read and con-
sider the Solicitor General's position. And, of all the briefs filed in the
case, the Solicitor General's was the most emphatic about the application of
Brooke Group to price-squeeze claims.
B. Leegin
In Leegin, 16 the Court overturned Dr. Miles,169 a century-old case that
declared resale price maintenance to be illegal per se under the Sherman
Act. 17 0 Resale price maintenance (RPM) occurs when a wholesaler and a
retail distributor agree on the minimum price the retailer will charge for the
wholesaler's product. 17 ' Under the Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles,
RPM was always illegal-if the plaintiff could show such an agreement was
in place, he automatically prevailed even if the defendant could offer a pro-
competitive justification for the practice. 172
The precedential erosion of Dr. Miles started just eight years later with
Colgate,73 in which the Court held that a plaintiff had to show actual agree-
ment between wholesaler and retailer to prevail under Dr. Miles.1 74 It was
not enough to show that the wholesaler announced his wish that the retailer
not sell for below a certain price and then unilaterally discontinued sales to
retailers who did not oblige.17 5 The erosion accelerated in the '70s and '80s
165. Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1117. The Court likewise felt obligated to address arguments
made by amici that a ruling in favor of AT&T would overrule Alcoa. See id at 1120 n.3.
166. Id. at 1121-22.
167. Id. at 1122.
168. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
169. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
170. Id. at 409.
171. Oz SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 383 (1995).
172. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881 ("In Dr. Miles . . . the Court established the rule that it is per
se illegal under § I of the Sherman Act .. . to set a minimum price the distributor can charge for the
manufacturer's goods.").
173. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
174. See id at 307-08 (distinguishing Colgate from Dr. Miles by noting that in Colgate there
was no evidence of an agreement to control prices).
175. See id at 307.
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as legal scholars began to articulate pro-competitive justifications for
vertical restraints like RPM. 17 6 And, in GTE Sylvania,'7 7 the Court removed
the per se illegal status for nonprice vertical restraints, such as territories.1
Dr. Miles was sick, but not dead, when Kay's Kloset sued Leegin in
2003. Kay's, a retail distributor of Leegin's line of accessories marketed
under the brand "Brighton," claimed that Leegin conditioned the store's
status as a Brighton retailer on Kay's promise not to cut prices.19 Leegin
had been more overt about its RPM policy than most firms who wanted the
benefits of RPM but feared liability under Dr. Miles. Most firms sought the
safe harbor of Colgate by only acting unilaterally, staying on the right side
of the line between using termination threats to induce minimum pricing
rather than making actual agreements with retailers.' 80  Leegin's policy
crossed that line flagrantly and in writing; they required stores carrying
Brighton products to sign an agreement preventing markdowns.' 8 1 The suit
should have been a slam dunk for Kay's, but the recent ill-health of
Dr. Miles emboldened Leegin to take it to trial and even to introduce eco-
nomic expert testimony to the effect that the per se prohibition on RPM, the
governing Supreme Court rule for almost a century, was economically
wrong headed.18 2  Of course, the district court excluded the testimony,
found in favor of Kay's, and entered judgment against Leegin.
After the Fifth Circuit affirmed,184 the controversy reached its intended
audience: the Supreme Court, the only court that could actually overrule
176. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280-98 (The Free Press 1993)
(1978) (arguing that the law prohibiting RPM is "at war with sound antitrust policy" because
manufacturers impose RPM not to restrict output and eliminate rivalry but to create distributive
efficiency); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 283-85 (1975) (explaining that manufacturers may set retail price minimums to
encourage dealers to increase point-of-sale services for the product, thus improving the marketing
for the manufacturer's product).
177. Cont'1 T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
178. Many commentators have noted the incoherency of treating non-price and price-based
vertical restraints differently. E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8-14 (1981).
179. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 883-84 (2007).
180. Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally-Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1797-98 (1999). For a discussion of the
inefficiencies of Colgate's formalism, see Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance
Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 91 n.76 (1994).
181. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 883.
182. Deposition of Kenneth G. Elzinga, Ph.D., Ex. A to Leegin's Response to Plaintiff's
Motion to Limit Testimony of Kenneth G. Elzinga, Ph.D., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-107, 2003 WL 24080773 (E.D. Tex. March 18, 2003).
183. Leegin, No. 2:03-CV-107, 2004 WL 5374523, at *5 (E.D. Tex. March 26, 2004).
184. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. App'x. 464 (5th Cir. 2006),
rev'd and remanded, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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Dr. Miles. Leegin was not coy about its intentions, arguing from the
certiorari stage that the Court must overrule Dr. Miles if it hoped to
maintain an economically coherent jurisprudence on vertical restraints.1ss
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, did just that in a lengthy opinion
that analyzed the economic arguments on both sides of the RPM debate, as
well as more judgly considerations like stare decisis and the relative value
of clear rules and fuzzy standards.186 Justice Kennedy concluded that since
economic theory raised several legitimate procompetitive justifications for
RPM, the practice would not "always or almost always tend to restrict com-
petition and decrease output" and so a per se ban was inappropriate.' 8 7
Economists defend RPM by arguing that the practice can encourage
competition along nonprice dimensions.' 8 8  Without RPM, a retailer can
always price compete with other retailers. He may find that he maximizes
profit by investing in an elegant store and quality salespeople because he
can sell belts and handbags for a price that more than makes up for these
investments. Or he may find that a bin of discounted belts and handbags in
a basement store attracts so many price-conscious customers that the sheer
number of products he sells makes up for the low price he gets for each
individual sale. But the retailer considering the high-end option encounters
a problem in the form of free riding.1 8 9 If his bargain-basement competitors
offer the same product for less, then shoppers may start at his elegant store,
benefit from the help of his knowledgeable staff, and then go to the bargain-
basement to actually buy the product.190 With free riding, shop owners
have a reduced incentive to invest in service and presentation.
A manufacturer or wholesaler might want its brand to be associated
with elegance, service, and status. But unless he can contract with each
retailer for specific levels of service and display' 9' (and monitor their
performance!) he may be powerless to influence the retailer's choices, and
this is especially troublesome if the free rider problem drives service and
ambiance down anyway. But if he eliminates a retailer's ability to drop the
price, then the retailer's only opportunity to compete with other retailers is
185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *5-7, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2006 WL
2849384.
186. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881-908.
187. Id. at 886 (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
188. One of the earliest proponents of this perspective was Professor Lester G. Telser. See
Lester G. Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
189. BORK, supra note 177, at 290.
190. Id; see also 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 13-14 (2d
ed. 2004).
191. Cf Tesler, supra note 189, at 94 ("[A manufacturer] may refuse to sell his product to
any retailer who does not provide the requisite special services.").
1278 [Vol. 89:1247
HeinOnline  -- 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1278 2010-2011
Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act
to offer better service and presentation.192 In effect, RPM gives
manufacturers control over the image of their products and the level of
point-of-sale services available to their customers by getting rid of the free
rider problem.19 3 This stimulates interbrand competition, even if it reduces
intrabrand competition.194
Even the proponents of RPM acknowledge that it has its
anticompetitive uses. It has the effect, always suspect under the Sherman
Act, of raising the price of a given product.'9 5  RPM defenders counter that
the product itself is different under an RPM scheme because it includes the
prestige, experience, and service that would otherwise not have come with-
out RPM.19 6 Some economists counter that there is no reason to believe that
consumers value these extra services. Professors (and Leegin amici) Scherer
and Comanor argue that "RPM, as a result, need not enhance consumer wel-
fare even when it is in the manufacturer's interest."' 97
Perhaps most troubling is the possibility that RPM can be used to
foster price fixing cartels, which are uncontroversially illegal per se under
the Sherman Act.'98 If instead of nakedly colluding, a group of competing
retailers could coerce their wholesaler into enforcing resale price agree-
ments with them,' 9 9  then they would get all the benefits of price fixing
192. See Posner, supra note 179, at II ("[T]he manufacturer's objective in restricting
competition among its dealers or distributors is to induce them to provide greater services to the
consumer.").
193. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 148 (explaining how "full service" stores that provide
better point-of-sale services like information and support can be undermined by "low service" stores
that provide no point-of-sale services when customers visit the full service store to obtain
information but ultimately order the product from a low service store).
194. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 913 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The result [of RPM] might be increased competition at the producer level,
i.e., greater inter-brand competition .... .").
195. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 191, at 40).
196. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 191, at 12 (discussing how service and
presentation can enhance brand image); Posner, supra note 179, at 19 (questioning the
superiority of lower prices to better services). For an example of how provision of sales
service can create product value, see Marvel, supra note 181, at 63 ("When first introduced,
food processors did not have an obvious use. To be marketed effectively, consumers had to
be shown the capabilities of food processors, a requirement met through expensive and
detailed dealer-provided demonstrations.").
197. Marvel, supra note 181, at 67 (citing works by Professors Comanor and Scherer).
198. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 191, at 42.
199. See Pauline M. Ippolito & Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: An
Economic Assessment of the Federal Trade Commission's Case Against the Corning Glass Works,
39 J.L. & ECON. 285, 298 (1996) ("Under this theory, [the manufacturer] would have been induced
to use RPM by its dealers, through credible threats of a group boycott of [the manufacturer's]
products.").
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without the § 1 liability. 200 In addition to facilitating retail cartels, RPM
might help manufacturers police their own illegal arrangements.201 A mem-
ber of a manufacturer cartel may be tempted to cheat by lowering his
wholesale price to a retailer, but if that retailer cannot pass that lower price
on to his customers, then total demand for the product will not change.2 02
The cheating wholesaler will only benefit, then, to the extent that some re-
tailers stop buying from his coconspirators to buy from him.2 03  If the
coconspirators' sales go down while the cheater's go up, coconspirators will
know he is cheating.20 4
At bottom, Leegin was a case about rules versus standards. The
question was not whether RPM should be legal or illegal but rather what
kind of rule should apply to it: the bright line of per se or the flexibility of
rule of reason analysis. The bright line invalidated the procompetitive uses
of RPM, while the rule of reason would be clumsy and, in practice, would
mean the defendant always wins.205 Appropriately, the Leegin opinion was
framed around this question of what kind of rule is appropriate for a prac-
tice that has some good and some bad uses.206 But the Court failed to
recognize that in order to answer this question, it needed to know something
about the relative frequency of the good and bad uses.
The Court reasoned that if a practice has any theoretical benefits, then it
cannot be properly subject to a per se rule,207 but the question was properly
empirical, not theoretical. The Court was bombarded with theoretical
arguments in favor of RPM from amici, but none could identify, as a
practical matter, how often the practice was used for competitive good
200. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 141-43; Edward 0. Correia, Resale Price
Maintenance-Searchingfor a Policy, 18 J. LEGIS. 187, 230 (1992).
201. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 191, at 88; Correia, supra note 201, at 221-24.
For example, the federal government's 1926 case against General Electric involved resale price
maintenance of light bulbs that was used to police a manufacturer-level cartel. Tesler, supra note
189, at 101.
202. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 191, at 87.
203. Id
204. Id. at 88-91.
205. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489-90 (1983) ("It is instructive that in the
almost three years since the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission took the
enforcement position that vertical minimum price fixing is illegal only if unreasonable under a rule
of reason, neither agency has found a single instance of vertical price fixing worthy of
challenge.").
206. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (noting
the existence of authority supporting both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of RPM).
207. See id. at 886 ("[W]e have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules ... where the
economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious." (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))).
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instead of competitive evil.208  The easier and more intuitively appealing
way for the Court to approach the question, then, was to decide the case on
purely theoretical grounds: if amici could produce enough hypothetical
benefits of RPM, that would cast doubt on the proposition that RPM
"always or almost always tend[ed] to restrict competition and decrease
output," making a per se rule inappropriate. Because "[v]ertical agreements
establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anti-
competitive effects, depending on the circumstances in which they are
formed," 2 0 9 a per se rule lacked the nuance necessary to sort out the good
eggs from the bad ones.
But the question of which kind of rule is most efficient-bright line or
standard-cannot be satisfactorily answered without data on the costs and
benefits of each option. A good decision, therefore, depends not only on
the frequency of anticompetitive uses of RPM but the magnitude of the
competitive harm, as weighed against the frequency and magnitude of the
competitive benefit. Indeed, this was the basis for Justice Breyer's
dissent.2 10 The Court was woefully lacking in this information, and it had
no investigatory abilities to gather it itself. So the case was decided a little
on anecdote and mostly on theory. With the economic information before
them, mostly from amici, the Court arguably made the best decision it
could, but that is only slight praise when one sees the thinness of the data
provided by amici.
The Court placed great weight on two amicus briefs2 11 (certiorari212
and merits) signed by twenty-five economists supporting rule of reason for
RPM liability, citing them directly four times in the opinion (the dissent
cited them once).213  The economists' briefs articulated the procompetitive
justifications for RPM, with an especially lucid passage on the free-rider
208. Part of the problem, of course, is that RPM was per se illegal for a century, so it would
naturally be difficult to extrapolate its use from past experience. But unilateral RPM, legal under
Colgate, was frequently used and had some of the same procompetitive and anticompetitive
aspects as RPM by agreement. Analogy, then, was possible, if imperfect.
209. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894.
210. Id. at 909-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of
Petitioner, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2006 WL 3244034; Brief of Amici Curiae
Economists in Support of Petitioner, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173681.
212. In an unusual move, Kay's denied consent to all amicus participation in favor of
certiorari, forcing amici to appeal to the Court for leave to file. See Motion for Leave to File Brief
and Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner, supra note 212 ("Petitioner has
consented to the filing of this brief, but Respondent has withheld consent, thus necessitating
the filing of this motion."). As discussed, the Court's practice is to give its permission as a
matter of course, see supra subpart I(A), and it did. Kay's did not bother to oppose the amicus
participation at the merits stage ofbriefing.
213. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889, 900, 904, 914.
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problem.214 They explained why RPM is a more efficient means of ensur-
ing point-of-sale perks than contracts between the manufacturer and retailer
about the appearance and experience of buying a product.2 15 But the brief
was also up-front about the possible anticompetitive uses of RPM, identi-
fying how the practice can be used to facilitate cartels at both the retail and
wholesale levels.2 16  After surveying the theoretical uses of RPM, the
economists concluded with a syllogism that the Court ultimately adopted: if
per se liability is only for practices that are almost always harmful, and
RPM is sometimes harmful and sometimes beneficial, then the right rule
217cannot be per se condemnation.
Although Professors Comanor and Scherer signed the economists'
brief, it turns out they did not endorse this syllogism. Leegin cited
Comanor's and Scherer's economic scholarship as supporting rule of reason
analysis for RPM.2 18 But their scholarship explaining procompetitive uses
for RPM was purely theoretical. Since the relative efficiency of rule of rea-
son analysis depended on how often the practice would be used in the
theoretically beneficial way, about which they had no data, they were
agnostic about the choice.2 19 Miffed at being co-opted to the rule of reason
side, they filed an amicus brief after the twenty-five economists' "in support
of neither party."220 In it they explained their academic work and said that
they only signed the economists' amicus brief on the condition that it say
"there is disagreement among economists about the prevalence of pro- and
anti-competitive uses of RPM."2 21
The Court was presented with some empirical information about the
benefits and costs of the Dr. Miles rule, but it was thin and unconvincing.22 2
Several amici cited an article with a promising title: "Resale Price
214. Brief of Amici Curiae Economists In Support of Petitioner, supra note 212, at 5-9.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 13.
217. See id. at 16 ("The position absent from the literature is that minimum RPM is most often,
much less invariably anticompetitive. Thus, the economics literature provides no support for the
application of a per se rule.").
218. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7 n.3, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 835316.
219. Brief for William S. Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 4-7, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173679.
220. Id.
221. Id at 3.
222. Perhaps even more problematic was the empirical evidence that was available but that was
not presented to the Court by amici or anyone else. For example, Professors Ippolito and Overstreet
have empirically examined how a judgment ending Corningware's decades-long use of RPM
affected the market for glass cookware and serving ware. In the case study, the professors measured
the competitive value of RPM by asking if its discontinuation made the relevant market more or less
competitive. Ippolito & Overstreet, supra note 200, at 293-94.
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Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation" by Pauline Ippolito 22 3 of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Her study was cited by multiple
amici (the economists, CTIA, the United States, and the American
Petroleum Institute)2 2 4 for the proposition that, as an empirical matter, RPM
is rarely used to facilitate cartels. But, as the dissent points out, the study's
methodology cannot support this conclusion.225 Ippolito found that among
the 153 RPM cases filed in federal court from 1976 to 1982, only 5.9%
alleged a manufacturer cartel.226 She concluded that "there is little evidence
... to support the hypothesis that the RPM law primarily deters collusion or
that collusion is the primary reason for the use of RPM."227 But counting
allegations of collusion in RPM cases is a faulty way to measure the fre-
quency with which manufacturers use RPM to collude, because if a plaintiff
has evidence of RPM, an allegation of horizontal collusion is redundant.
Another promising title, "Resale Price Maintenance: Economic
Theories and Empirical Evidence," 228 provided a slightly more robust
empirical payoff. Thomas Overstreet showed that during the reign of the
Miller-Tydings Act,2 2 9 which allowed states to pass laws allowing RPM,
the states that chose to allow RPM had higher average consumer prices (by
as much as 27%) than the fourteen states that did not.230 Justice Breyer, in
his Leegin dissent, multiplied this fraction by the amount the average family
spends today on goods likely to be subject to RPM, to forecast "retail bills
that are higher by an average of roughly $750 to $1,000 annually for an
American family of four."231
Amici also presented empirical evidence by anecdote, most saliently
by PING, Inc., a manufacturer of high-end golf equipment who filed an
223. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34
J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991).
224. Brief of the American Petroleum Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11
n.3, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-280), 2007 WL 160781; Brief of CTIA-The Wireless
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14-15, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-280),
2007 WL 160782; Brief of Amici Curiae Economists In Support of Petitioner, supra note 212, at
14-15; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Leegin, 551 U.S.
877 (No. 06-280), 2007 WL 173650.
225. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 920 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226. Ippolito, supra note 224, at 282 tbl.7.
227. Id. at 281.
228. THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT TO THE FTC-
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1983), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/be/ecourpt/233105.pdf.
229. Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975).
230. OVERSTREET, supra note 229, at 112.
231. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 926 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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amicus brief supporting Leegin.232 In its brief, PING emphasized the costs
of the current per se rule, claiming to have spent millions in legal fees on
maintaining a unilateral price maintenance scheme that would pass Colgate
muster.23 3 They highlighted the absurdity of having to tell their retailers
that PING and the retailers cannot agree on a resale price, but if they sell
golf clubs to customers for less than a given price, then they will be
terminated.234 PING also pointed out the inefficiencies of having to divert
all inquiries about resale pricing to their legal department.23 5 The National
Association of Manufacturers, in its brief, made a similar point, slamming
the inefficiencies of the Dr. Miles-Colgate line.236
What was the Court to do with scant, old, and anecdotal evidence of
the per se rule's efficiencies? The answer, according to a dissenting Justice
Breyer, was to leave standing precedent in place; in the face of
indeterminacy, the law prefers the status quo.237 But the majority opinion
had an equally appealing logic: in the face of indeterminacy, the law prefers
a flexible standard that allows for individualized inquiry.2 38 Without rigor-
ous data about the costs and benefits of RPM, neither position is
epistemologically justifiable. The majority-dissent debate devolved into a
discussion of whether a tie ought to go to the runner or the baseman, in this
case to the plaintiff or the defendant. But what we have in the RPM debate
is not a tie-it is an uncertainty. It is not that the benefits of RPM are close
to its costs, but that the relative costs and benefits of RPM are unknown.
The amici could only provide theory and anecdote, and without the ability
to empirically investigate RPM itself, the Court ultimately divided
according to political preferences about regulation.2 39
IV. A New Deal for Antitrust
Without the informational benefits of expertise and notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the Court may be a poor choice to define the broad
proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Framed this way, the problem has an
232. Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No.
06-480), 2007 WL 173680.
233. Id. at 10.
234. Id at 15.
235. Id. at 11-15.
236. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the National
Association of Manufacturers in Support of Petitioner at 6-11, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480),
2006 WL 3244035.
237. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 929 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. See id at 894 (arguing that because RPM's anticompetitive effects are uncertain, "these
agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation").
239. Only the liberal Justices dissented: Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
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obvious solution: give the power to interpret the Act to an expert agency.240
This idea has academic support already, 241 and the case for it is strengthened
by this Article's observation that the Court has tried to approximate adminis-
trative decision making by relying on amicus briefs. The obvious candidates
for reallocation are the two existing antitrust agencies: the Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division and the FTC.
A. The Agency Solution
Using agencies to give specific meaning to American antitrust's most
important statute means avoiding the problems with the Court's current
quasi-administrative process for rulemaking. As adjudicators, agency ex-
perts would know what kind of economic evidence is necessary for an
efficient solution and would be better able to understand it when it is pre-
sented by the parties. Repeat exposure to antitrust cases would only
reinforce this advantage, while also giving the administrative judges a
broader perspective on what kinds of conflicts commonly arise in
competition law, a perspective necessary for efficient policy making in the
first instance. A Supreme Court Justice hears about one antitrust case a
year, hardly the cross section of controversies necessary to make efficient
economic policy writ large.
Agencies could take policy making a step further using notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Unlike in adjudication, regulation by rulemaking can
be initiated without the formal requirements of a case or controversy and a
proper appeal to the Supreme Court. Informal letters of complaint could
spark an investigation. A rule-making agency could announce its intention
to regulate publicly and provide a convenient venue for, or even solicit, ex-
pert opinions on the economic impact of the proposed rule. Not only would
it have the benefit of these numerous perspectives, but it would also have
the obligation to respond to them in a reasoned manner. Its rule would be
subject to judicial review, affording an opportunity to catch mistakes 242 or
invalidate rules that do nothing but deliver rents to special interests.
Another advantage of rulemaking, an option for agencies but not for
the Court, since it only operates through adjudication, is that rulemaking
240. I am indebted to Harvard Law School Climenko Fellow Michael Burstein for helping me
develop this idea.
241. E.g., Crane, supra note 5, at 1211.
242. In contrast, when a court makes an antitrust rule in the first instance, its mistakes may go
unchecked. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 674 (2009) ("The Court
relied, as a reason to deny antitrust liability, upon the mistaken idea that a settlement with one
generic firm would spur other generic firms to action, and that these firms would have the large
incentive provided by the exclusivity period. In fact, later filers are ineligible for the exclusivity
period.").
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regulates behavior ex ante, while resolution of economic policy through
cases is necessarily ex post. Antitrust courts worry obsessively about
"chill"--deterring procompetitive behavior with overly broad rules for
liability.2 43  In fact, the overruling of Dr. Miles in Leegin implies that the
entire twentieth century was a period of inefficient business practices and
stunted innovation in distribution because of an early misunderstanding of
RPM. Only after a long and expensive period of litigation was Leegin re-
deemed for breaking the law by effecting a change in the law, and only
after Leegin was issued were similar firms, perhaps walking the Colgate
line better than Leegin, redeemed for wanting some control over their
product's ultimate retail price.24 4 The problem of ex post rulemaking is
made worse by the treble damages afforded successful plaintiffs suing under
the Sherman Act.2 4 5 To create a new form of liability, the Court has to pun-
ish a firm threefold for complying with standing antitrust norms. Thus
Supreme Court lawmaking in antitrust is a kind of one-way ratchet.246
The result of the current ex post scheme is that "antitrust law leaves
considerable gaps between what is permissible and what is optimal." 2 47
With judges making the rules one case at a time, this gap is justifiable. As
discussed above, when judges are not economically sophisticated enough to
know where "optimal" lies, 24 8 laissez-faire is a very inexpensive regulatory
regime for courts to follow, and raising the level of regulation would effect
a kind of taking of property from firms operating under the status quo. So
if the Court is making antitrust policy, laissez-faire may be the only sensible
approach. But that is not to say that it is the most sensible approach. An
agency could provide firms with the necessary clarity-ex ante-that they
243. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J.) ("Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well,
through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic
ends they seek to serve."). Professors Hungar and Koopmans argue that Circuit cases that punish
procompetitive behavior are especially likely to be reviewed by the Court. Similarly, the Court
worries about the "chilling effect of vague rules." Hungar & Koopmans, supra note 57, at 56; cf
Posner, supra note 179, at 15 (arguing that the vagueness of the Rule of Reason "places at
considerable hazard any restriction that a manufacturer imposes on its dealers and distributors").
244. And RPM is hardly the only example of conduct, once prohibited by antitrust, that has
been made legal by the Court citing pro-competitive grounds. "Despite the fact that the Sherman
Act's text has remained unchanged the Court has pulled sudden 'switcheroos' on its rules for
monopolization, mergers, and vertical integration." Andrew S. Oldham, Shernan's March (In)to
the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REv. 319, 366-67 (2007) (citation omitted).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
246. Contra Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 139 ("[Tjhere is no ratchet in antitrust.... The
belated arrival of wisdom is no reason for refusal to learn and change.").
247. Crane, supra note 5, at 1193.
248. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) ("The fact is that courts are
of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems."); see also id. at 611 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("[C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-situated for" antitrust policy making).
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need when conducting business in a world where competitive behavior so
closely resembles anticompetitive conduct. The current state of affairs is
that much more is illegal on the books than antitrust lawyers think is
actually likely to be struck down in a court.24 9 Lawyers thrive in such a
legally uncertain world, but firm efficiency suffers.
To inform its rulemaking and adjudicative decisions, an expert agency
would have investigative abilities the Court lacks. It could gather data and
conduct studies when good antitrust policy depends on hard facts, which, so
the consensus holds, it usually does. 2 50  Data collection would be much
easier for an agency than for the Court, since an agency can be endowed
with broad investigatory powers and some, unlike the Supreme Court, can
demand discovery and "require firms to supply annual and special
reports." 25 1  An agency might employ hundreds of economists and
statisticians well-qualified to design such a study and analyze its results.
Defendants would no longer be able to advocate against liability by saying
that the theoretically efficient rule is so unwieldy in the hands of inexpert
judges that laissez-faire is the only workable option. To be sure, they could
still argue that the theoretically efficient rule is too indeterminate even for
economists to pinpoint, or too abstract to be clearly articulated to regulated
firms. But if we think economists have at least a marginally higher toler-
ance for economic complexity than do lay judges, the economists must be
better at fashioning and enforcing rules that regulate sensitive real-world
economic systems.
B. The Antitrust Division or the FTC?
Under the current regime, the FTC and the Antitrust Division share the
responsibility of promulgating and enforcing antitrust rules, 25 2 but neither is
authorized to interpret the Sherman Act in the first instance. The Antitrust
Division's primary areas of activity are criminal cartel prosecution and
merger law enforcement. 2 53 The Antitrust Division does not issue rules
subject to Chevron deference, but it does issue guidelines that are influential
on courts and so also on firm behavior. The most well-known of these
guidelines are the Horizontal Merger Guidelines that the FTC uses to
249. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 11-12 (2010)
(characterizing the George W. Bush Administration's approach to antitrust as a return to "the free-
market, anti-enforcement policies of the Reagan and first Bush [A]dministrations").
250. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2006) (describing the investigatory and reporting
capabilities of the FTC).
251. MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 35 (3d ed. 2006).
252. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14
(2007).
253. JOELSON, supra note 252, at 31.
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approve or block major combinations in administrative proceedings.254
Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division can bring suit alleging civil viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.255 For reasons related more to custom than to
relative competency, they have awkwardly divided civil enforcement re-
sponsibilities: the FTC brings suits related to energy, healthcare, retail stores,
and computer hardware, while the Antitrust Division brings suits related to
agriculture, telecom, travel, and computer software.256 Only the Antitrust
257Division can bring criminal prosecutions.
The Antitrust Division, as compared to the FTC, is a less attractive
option for re-allocation of Sherman Act interpretive power. It is an executive
agency authorized to enforce norms but not to create them. Since its head
serves at the pleasure of the President, each change in administration brings
the potential for new enforcement priorities. Interpretive power over the
Sherman Act should go to an independent agency, one more likely to be
technocratic, not political, in its execution. The FTC is such an agency.
The FTC is a superior choice also because it already plays a direct role
in Sherman Act interpretation since it regulates mergers prohibited by § 2 of
the Act. 25 8  And unlike the Antitrust Division, it already has rulemaking
ability. The FTC Act of 1914 created the agency and gave it authority to
proscribe "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 2 59  But
Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority to the FTC was ambiguous in
scope, allowing it to "make such rules and regulations" but not specifying
whether those rules would be binding. 26 0  So the delegation has been
interpreted to confer only interstitial jurisdiction to the agency; that is, the
agency may use its rulemaking authority merely to fill the gaps left by the
Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. 26 1 In fact, the FTC rarely uses
254. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
255. See ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL
CONTEXT 645 (2d ed. 2004) (describing overlapping civil jurisdiction of the Antitrust Division and
the FTC).
256. See Crane, supra note 5, at 1199.
257. Id. at 1198.
258. 15 U.S.C. § 18a gives the FTC express authority to regulate mergers under the Clayton
Act. Conversely, the FTC's authority to enforce the terms of the Sherman Act is not statutorily
granted. However, the FTC Act grants the FTC broad powers to regulate "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). By
exercising this power, the FTC can enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act. 1 JOHN J. MILES,
HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 6:13 (2010).
259. JOELSON, supra note 252, at 26.
260. Custos, supra note 107, at 619 & n.22.
261. Posner, supra note 75, at 766.
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its power to promulgate such rules under notice-and-comment rulemaking, 262
a fact that prompted Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to say that the agency
"should be ashamed" of its flimsy record of rulemaking.263
A change in the FTC's statutory authority could change this. Congress
could mandate Chevron deference for the agency's interpretation of antitrust
norms by amending the Sherman Act to confer primary authority over its
interpretation to the FTC. The shift in legal regime might seem subtle since
the FTC already has antitrust rulemaking authority (if weak and interstitial)
under a different statute. But giving the FTC dominion over the Sherman
Act, American antitrust's constitution, would mean taking the task of large-
scale policy making out of the hands of an inexpert Court whose best access
to economic arguments are amicus briefs and placing it in the hands of an
institution designed to deal with technical scientific matters thoroughly and
transparently.
C. Objections
Giving an agency authority to interpret the Sherman Act in the first
instance raises several concerns. First, if Congress were to give an agency
the final word on how to implement the vague incantations against
monopolization found in the Sherman Act, it might violate the
nondelegation doctrine.264 For an agency's norm-creation power to have
any meaning, it would have to include the ability to override past precedent
interpreting the Act. A century's worth of jurisprudence on competition
policy could be scratched and replaced by any set of rules that purport to
invalidate any "combination . . . in restraint of trade,"26 5 which, by its plain
meaning, could preclude partnership agreements and pedestrian mergers.
Of course, if giving an agency this power violates the nondelegation
doctrine, then so does giving the courts this power; the nondelegation doc-
trine does not only limit delegation by Congress to agencies, but it also
262. See id. at 768-69.
263. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DIscRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 70-74
(1969). The reason for its reluctance is that FTC rules outside of the merger context get little
respect from the courts, as evidenced by a recent skirmish between the agency and the Eleventh
Circuit over pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlements. After following procedures that "loosely
mimicked the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for agency rule making," the FTC
denounced any "reverse payments" between a branded drug manufacturer and its generic
counterpart that exceeded $2 million. The Eleventh Circuit reversed this rule in Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1lth Cir. 2005), implying that a regulation passed by the FTC must
not clash with the Circuit's own precedent. Although the FTC was neither a party nor an amicus
to the earlier case in question, the court considered the agency bound by it and so precluded from
promulgating a contrary rule. Crane, supra note 5, at 1200-01.
264. See Oldham, supra note 245, at 367-79 (sketching out the history of the nondelegation
doctrine and its possible application to the antitrust context).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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limits delegation to courts.266 So technically it would be incoherent to say
that the delegation of power to an agency violates the nondelegation doc-
trine while delegation without saying the current state of affairs is
unconstitutional. But Congress's delegation of power to the Court in the
form of the Sherman Act is so entrenched, and the Court is now so limited
by the stare decisis effect of its own decisions, that the delegation is not
likely to be seen as controversial. In contrast, advocates of separation of
powers might be understandably nervous about redelegating power of com-
petition policy writ large to an agency today writing on a blank slate.
The transfer of power may need to be more piecemeal than that.
Instead of amending the Sherman Act to confer broad interpretive authority
to the FTC, Congress could pass statutes on individual competition law
controversies-like tying, resale price maintenance, and refusals to deal-
giving the FTC more guidance about how to prioritize rulemaking. These
statutes would be designed to supersede the Sherman Act; they would dis-
place the Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act as it related to the
particular practices, while leaving in place less controversial Supreme Court
rules under the Act, such as the prohibition on naked price fixing. Or
Congress could achieve this same effect by amending the Sherman Act to
be more precise in its economic aims.
Second, critics of my plan may object to the removal of antitrust from
its populist roots and placing it in the hands of unelected technocrats. After
all, "[t]here have been times in American history when antitrust was a
magisterial pursuit that stirred the public imagination, exposed visceral
ideological impulses, and shaped perspectives on adjacent matters, like labor
policy, securities regulation, and taxation." 26 7  Professor Daniel A. Crane
responds to this criticism in an article advocating increased norm-creation
powers for the antitrust agencies. He argues that when a field meets three
criteria, it is ready for a shift towards technocracy: "consensus on ends,
resolution of foundational ideological questions, and the absence of explicit
distributive considerations." 2 68 Antitrust meets these criteria. After Bork, 26 9
any antitrust policymaker must defend his rule as promoting economic
efficiency; there is wide consensus that this is the proper end of antitrust
266. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 421-43 (2008) (exploring the practice of
delegating lawmaking authority to the Judicial Branch and arguing that this practice deserves more
scholarly attention).
267. Crane, supra note 5, at 1159-60 (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 1161.
269. BORK, supra note 177; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
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regulation. 2 70  Ideological debate, once prominent in antitrust, has largely
given way to debate over economic theory and data.2 7 1 Finally, as Crane
argues, antitrust is no longer thought to have a serious redistributive
effect--competitive efficiency seeks to expand the pie, not distribute the
slices.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court is right to turn to amicus briefs in Sherman Act
cases because it is there that the Court finds the economic evidence and rea-
soning that ought to influence antitrust policy. The move is evidence that
scholars like Robert Bork and Richard Posner have succeeded in reforming
antitrust legal analysis from analogical reasoning to scientifically informed
pursuit of efficiency. But the Court can only go so far with its awkward hy-
brid of adjudication and administrative rulemaking. It is, after all, a court
comprised of generalist judges charged with resolving individual cases and
controversies. And amicus briefs are an anemic substitute for comments on a
rulemaking. The Court's recent mistakes in Leegin and LinkLine, traceable
to its reliance on amici, lend support for a further technocratic shift in
Sherman Act rulemaking: a New Deal for antitrust.
270. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006) (citing "the
virtual consensus among economists" that tying arrangements can be economically efficient in
supporting a holding that a plaintiff must affirmatively prove that a tying arrangement confers
market power to establish an antitrust violation); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed.
2001) ("[T]he only goal of antitrust law should be to promote efficiency in the economic
sense...."); Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557,
561-62 (2010) (observing that the view that agencies should protect consumers from market
concentration was "most prevalent during the Warren Court era, [but] has been resoundingly
rejected by U.S. courts for more than thirty years" and concluding that "[l]ong-run efficiency is the
exclusive goal of modern competition enforcement"); Thomas 0. Bamett, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Luncheon Address to the Federalist Society, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 29,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/230627.pdf ("[A]n analytical
consensus [on the Supreme Court] has emerged. The Court has accepted the focus on economic
efficiency .... ). But see John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 196
(2008) (rejecting this view in arguing that "[t]he ultimate objective of [antitrust] laws, in short, is to
protect consumers, not to increase overall efficiency").
271. See Crane, supra note 5, at 1164 (observing that antitrust enforcement has ceased being an
ideological battleground and has since become a "professional, active, and ... quietly technocratic
and successful enterprise" of legal and economic specialists).
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